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I. INTRODUCTION: MARKETS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TASTES
A. The Question to be Explored
The role of a free market economy in our system of constitu-
tional values is a perennial subject of debate. In some places, of
course, the Constitution seems to supply direct support to the insti-
tutions of the free market, for example, in the takings' and con-
tracts clauses.2 In this sense, the market is one of many constitu-
tional values, related to the others only in that it is derived from
the same source.
Some commentators have discussed the causal role of the free
market in helping or thwarting the pursuit of other constitutional
values.3 For example, Milton Friedman has argued that the free
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any . . .Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts ....").
3. See infra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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market is necessary to preserve freedom of speech: in a system of
socialized property a dissident would have difficulty obtaining
access to the necessary means of production to publish books or
newspapers critical of the state.4 At the same university, but a
considerable distance away on the political spectrum, Cass Sunstein
has argued that private property and freedom of contract are threats
to constitutional values, since they distort the structure of resources
and tastes necessary for full political participation.'
Others have considered the analytical links between free mar-
kets and constitutional values.6 Some have contrasted "property
rights" and "personal rights," noting the inherently exclusionary
character of the former,7 while others have argued that property
rights are an integral part of personal rights, supplying the nec-
essary space for their autonomous exercise.8
In this Article, I will consider a different interchange between
the free market and constitutional values. The Article explores
whether the existence of our free market institutions causes us to
embrace certain constitutional values.9 In other words, would we
place such a preeminent value on racial and religious tolerance,
personal privacy, and the freedoms of speech and press if we had
not long lived under predominantly free market institutions? More-
over, if we were to substantially abolish the free market, would we
continue to place preeminent importance on the constitutional val-
ues that we currently cherish?
These are large questions, and a fully satisfactory answer
would require a rather extensive historical and comparative analysis
of various cultures. Max Weber's work on the empirical linkages
4. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 16-21 (1962).
5. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1552-58
(1988). See also JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TIlE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (1990) ("The Framers' preoccupation with property generated a
shallow conception of democracy and a system of institutions that allocates political power
unequally and fails to foster political participation.").
6. See infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
7. See KARL MARX, GRUNDRISSE 131 (M. Nicholas trans.. 1973) ("This kind of [capi-
talist] individual liberty is ... at the same time the most complete suppression of all
individual liberty and total subjugation of individuality to social conditions which take the
form of material forces-and even of all-powerful objects that are independent of the
individuals creating them.").
8. See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONST1TrION 181
(1980) ("Liberties are not always neatly separable but are often linked and intertwined.').
9. See Friedrich Hayek, The Causes and Consequences of Our Values: A Problem for
Science, reprinted in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 318-30 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt Leube
eds., 1984) (discussing the broader question of the source of our morals).
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between market economic systems and various systems of religious
and social belief are clearly an important point of reference. ° This
Article, however, pursues a different methodology. It explores
whether market incentives have systematic effects on the values of
market actors, strengthening certain values and weakening others.
The argument is that contemporary constitutional values reflect in
large part the values which market institutions tend to generate in
their participants. The next section discusses the various ways in
which economic incentives are likely to impact upon the tastes and
values of the citizens subject to the institutions creating those in-
centives.
B. Mechanisms for the Influence of Economic Incentives on
Values
1. Economic Mechanisms
In economic analysis, values may be regarded as a kind of
exogenously determined taste," but this attitude seems rather arti-
ficial.' If particular institutions make a given taste more expen-
sive, one would of course tend to see that taste less frequently
placated by the actor's behavior. However, one would also expect
to see pressure placed upon the taste itself. There need not be any
conscious act of self redefinition. Rather, the mechanism of change
may simply be the slow process of cultural evolution, in which
tastes that are too expensive are downplayed and forgotten in favor
of others with which they compete. People who persist in holding
10. See generally Max Rheinstein, Introduction to MAX WEBER, WIRTSHAFr UND
GESELLSCHAFT [MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SociEry] xxvi (Max Rheinstein
ed. & Edward Shills & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954) ("[Max Weber's] ambitious plan was
to investigate, upon the broadest possible scale, the interrelationships between economic
institutions and relationships, and all other Phenomena and relationships of society, of the
present and the past.").
11. See MAURICE LEVt, THINKING ECONOMICALLY 33 (1985) (noting that tastes are
regarded as exogenous). The theories predict behavior based upon existing tastes, technolo-
gies, resource availability, and prices. See, e.g., BRUNO S. FREY, ECONOMICS AS A SCI-
ENCE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5-9 (1992) (discussing the various incentives affecting human
behavior as seen by economists). With uncharacteristic humility, economists have usually
regarded tastes as matters outside their scope of competence, to be explained, if at all, by
psychology or other disciplines. See, e.g., id. at 21 ("The total neglect of psychological
elements in the economic conception of man is deplored and it is demanded that more
insights of psychology be introduced into economics. The psychological model of human
behavior is taken to be vastly superior to the economic view.").
12. See supra note 11.
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tastes that are very expensive to satisfy will not be as happy as
those able to modify their tastes. To the extent that people demand
happiness and imitate those who seem to have obtained it, less
expensive tastes are more likely to survive than more expensive
ones, ceteris paribus.
At this point, a counter-tendency should be noted. The more
expensive a taste becomes to satisfy, the more its satisfaction can
serve as a status symbol distinguishing wealthier individuals from
others. 3 If it does become a status symbol, the taste for that item
may be greatly increased, even on the part of people who cannot
at present afford it, as the quest for social standing is surely a
powerful human motivation. 4 Moreover, the dominant culture may
disfavor any attempt by the less fortunate to reject the values that
others cherish on the grounds that they cannot obtain them; con-
sider the attitude reflected in the story about the fox who felt that
the grapes he could not reach must have been sour anyway."
Therefore, the values that a market society will generate are
those that market institutions will make not only costly to reject,
but particularly costly for those most fully assimilated and success-
ful in that society to reject. In such cases, "sour grapes" (or, to put
a more favorable label on it, "character planning") 6 and status
seeking, far from working at cross purposes, will reinforce each
other. Because of the great cost of rejecting such values among the
elite, others who are inclined to emulate the successful will be led
to embrace the values even more rapidly than they would based
only on the more immediate cost of rejecting them.
2. Psychological Mechanisms
While economists may hesitate to explain tastes, the discipline
of cognitive psychology has developed an appreciable literature
addressing the question of attitude change.'7 To a considerable
extent, this literature simply extends the essential logic of the
13. Richard H. MeAdams, Competitive Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 40-41 (1992); see
.generally id. at 1.
14. See id. at 37 (discussing psychological studies on the importance of the search for
relative status).
15. See generally JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIO-
NALITY (1983) (discussing the "sour grapes" theory behind why individuals make certain
decisions and hold specific attitudes).
16. See Luc Bovens, Sour Grapes and Character Planning, 89 J. PHIL. 57 (1992) (dis-
cussing the difference between these two concepts).
17. See infra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
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economist's model into the realm of tastes, suggesting that beliefs
and tastes, or more generally, "attitudes," will change based upon
the psychological cost of continuing to hold those attitudes in the
face of other beliefs one takes pleasure in holding."
For example, suppose that a person was predisposed to have a
taste for a good brawl with co-workers on minor provocation. Sup-
pose also that this became an expensive taste to hold, bringing on
the ire of supervisors and threats of termination. Standard economic
theory would predict that fighting behavior, having been made
more expensive, would decrease.19 However, would the person, as
she observed her own behavior over time, continue to think of
herself as a hot-tempered fighter and of fighting as a desirable
activity?
The cognitive psychologist Daryl Bem introduced the idea of
"self-perception theory." Under this theory, beliefs and attitudes are
often not fully known to the individual. Therefore, the individual
seeks to discover what those attitudes are, using her own behavior
in undertaking that investigation.20 According to this theory, a sys-
tem that discourages fighting behavior could, over time, also dis-
courage the accompanying attitudes, as people try to explain their
own behavior to themselves in a way that makes their own person-
alities and beliefs comfortably coherent with their behavior.2'
Again, a countertendency needs to be noted. Psychological
studies have found that behavior inconsistent with a prior attitude
is less likely to change that attitude if one can find a readily avail-
able external motivation for the behavior.2 In those studies, a
person who was paid $1 to give a speech contrary to her own atti-
tude was more likely to change her beliefs than a person paid
$20 .' The former person found it more difficult to rationalize her
18. This theory generally goes under the heading of cognitive dissonance, which holds
that the psychological tension between incompatible cognitions is a source of attitude
change. See PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL R. LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE
CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 107-24 (1991) (discussing dissonance theory).
19. See, e.g., LEVI, supra note 11 at 29-48 (discussing the basic effects of price on
supply and demand).
20. Daryl J. Bern, Self-Perception Theory, 6 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 1, 4-8 (1972).
21. Id. at 1-62 (discussing how and why individuals define and change their own per-
ceptions of themselves).
22. See Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced
Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 203 (1959) (detailing an experiment which
proved such results).
23. Id. at 205-06.
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own behavior by reference to the external incentive, and therefore
felt greater pressure to describe her own attitudes as different from
what they had previously been.24 According to this theory, a su-
pervisor discouraging fights by making explicit threats of economic
sanctions will provide an easy way for workers to explain their
own nonfighting behavior to themselves without invoking a non-
fighting attitude.
There are, however, two problems with this objection. One
problem is that it is harder to rationalize an entire course of con-
duct than a single instance of it. It is one thing to say that I will
give a speech for a cause in which I do not believe if I am paid
well for doing so; it is far less flattering to the ego to believe that
I will continue to act contrary to my own values for long periods
of time because of the wishes of another person.' A pacifist
could retain her beliefs after being paid to give a pro-war speech,
but would she be likely to remain a pacifist after working for the
missile division of General Dynamics for five years?26
A second difficulty with this argument relates back to the
incentive structures for the market's most assimilated and success-
ful participants.' Persons at the top of corporate hierarchies pre-
sumably take fewer direct orders from others, but their profits will
often be connected with the economic successes of their ventures.
If fighting is bad for business, the manager who refrains from
fighting will not have the lower-level employee's rationalization
that some direct superior compelled her to act in that way. Persons
with a direct stake in the residual income of firms are probably the
most likely to embrace personally whatever values contribute to
profitability because the external pressures operating upon them are
rather distant and abstract.28
24. Id. at 209-10.
25. See Roger A. Elkin & Michael R. Leippe, Physiological Arousal, Dissonance, and
Attitude Change: Evidence for a Dissonance-Arousal Link and a "Don't Remind Me"
Effect, 51 J. PERSONALrY & Soc. PSYCH. 55 (1986) (discussing an experiment which
showed that the writing of a counterattitudinal essay has been found to change attitudes).
26. This would be especially true if the job called upon the worker to publicly justify
the activities of the firm on a frequent basis.
27. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
28. Of course, one could say that corporate managers are continuously taking orders
from consumers. However true as a matter of economics, such orders seem to be
.differerent psychologically from orders received directly from a hierarchical superior. It
would seem to be much harder to explain one's acquiescence in consumers' orders as a
product of external pressure. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (discussing
power of external influences).
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An additional mechanism of attitudinal change is the cost of
feigning attitudes, or of consistently behaving in a manner incom-
patible with one's attitudes. The easiest way to stay out of fights is
not to want to fight; it is psychologically costly to constantly check
one's urge to engage in fighting. In a sense, this brings one back
to economic theory proper, which predicts changes in behavior
from changes in relative prices.29 Changing one's attitude is pre-
sumably a mental process with a corresponding physical component
to it; it is a form of behavior. If employers only cared about the
absence of fighting behavior and if feigning a no-fighting attitude
was costless, the incentive would be to retain one's attitude'but
drop the behavior. However, if feigning behavior was costly and
occasionally ineffective, the high price put on fighting should, on
the margin, encourage people to engage in taste-changing behavior.
Another mechanism of attitude change is the simple imitation
of the conduct of others, whether those others are perceived as
higher in status or not. Studies confirm that most people have a
strong desire to conform, and are likely to entertain approving
attitudes toward the normal behavior of those they observe."0 If
fighting behavior becomes less common (by virtue of the standard
economic tendency of high prices to discourage the priced behav-
iors), it will come to seem less normal and therefore less accept-




Even if one of these mechanisms is ineffective for a given
individual-major attitude change of any kind is apparently not
very frequent in adults32-other mechanisms could operate on the
culture as a whole. For example, one goal of child-rearing is to
discourage a child from developing those tastes that will prove pro-
hibitively costly to satisfy in the future. This involves more than
refraining from "spoiling" a child with an extravagant lifestyle; it
29. See LEVI, supra note 11, at 7-8 (describing how changes in the price of cars will
alter consumer demand for those cars).
30. JOHN LAMBERTH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 11-13, 268-78 (1980).
31. See id. at 268-69 ("Conformity is an incredibly common occurrence . . . . People
do conform, even though they might have to go to extremes to do it.").
32. See MARY JOHN SMITH, PERSUASION AND HUMAN ACTION 16 (1982) ("In general,
over 30 years of research confirms that the major persuasive effect of mass media adver-
tising and programming is not the alteration, but the creation of new and the reaffirmation
of existing attitudes, norms, and values.") (citations omitted).
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also includes teaching those values, such as hard work and respect-
ful manners, that will make one's life infinitely easier if they come
naturally than if they have to be feigned or maintained grudgingly.
Accordingly, if institutions systematically make particular tastes
more costly, one would expect that children would increasingly be
taught not to cultivate such tastes in the first place, so that they
would not need to undergo difficult attitude changes later in life.
4. Summary
In any event, for the remainder of the Article the conclusion
of this section will be assumed: institutions which raise the price
of a particular behavior, and especially institutions which impose a
particularly high cost for that behavior on the most imitated and
envied segments of society, will tend to discourage not only that
behavior but also the tastes which produce that behavior. Over
time, the values of the members of a society will change in the
direction of values rewarded by the prevailing institutions.
C. The Internal Criticism Problem
Before proceeding to show how market institutions support
specific values, an important obstacle to the demonstration must be
explored. For reasons explained below, I will call this obstacle the
"Internal Criticism Problem."
33
Institutions frequently subject themselves to criticism from
within.' The values that permeate a particular institution are like-
ly to manifest themselves not only in the operation of the institu-
tion but also in the aspirations which that institution holds for
future changes. Military officials frequently criticize their units for
insubordination and sloppy behavior.35 College faculties criticize
their internal governance structures for maintaining insufficiently
democratic and participatory processes.36 Corporate executives and
business schools criticize the serious inefficiencies of contemporary
corporations.37
33. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Michael Hill, Integration of New South African Army Jeopardized, THE
BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 13, 1994, at 6A (discussing criticism of certain soldiers by officers
for lacking discipline).
36. See, e.g., Sarah Suiter, Jobs are Job #1 for Zeiss, Bus. J.-CHARLOTrE, Aug. 22,
1994, at 3 (describing faculty complaints about effective and popular college president's
top-down management style, disregard of their opinions, and insensitive remarks).
37. See, e.g., Tom Redbum & James Flanigan, The Remanufacturing of America: U.S.
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The Internal Criticism Problem is the tendency to assume an
institution is in fact defective vis-A-vis other institutions along the
lines that its own internal criticism suggests. One might conclude
the following: that corporations are strikingly inefficient institutions;
that military units are exceptionally disobedient; and that college
faculties are quite obedient and efficient. The fallacy in these ex-
amples is evident, mistaking the internal criticism of an institution
already under the heavy sway of the values animating that criticism
for an external appraisal of that institution.
Similarly, market societies, it will be argued, develop certain
tastes, including a taste for racial and religious tolerance and for
privacy of thought and action." One result of these tastes would
be an endless torrent of internal criticism from those inside market
societies that the societies are insufficiently tolerant and respectful
of privacy. A critic who was unaware of the Internal Criticism
Problem and who did not engage in extensive comparative analysis
might conclude that market societies must be worse along these
dimensions than non-market societies, where such criticism is less
apparent.39
Specifically, one needs to look at contemporary societies that
have substantially undermined free market systems, such as North
Korea, Cuba, Iraq, and Syria, or at past anti-market societies such
as Maoist China and the former Soviet Union. How well did dif-
ferent ethnic groups get along in these societies?4" How effectively
could women compete with men for substantial positions in the
Firms Regain Competitive Edge, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1987, at 1, 23 ("[Many analysts]
are not yet convinced that most U.S. business leaders have discarded the inefficient ways
of the past and embraced the principles of flexible manufacturing.").
38. See infra notes 75-241 and accompanying text.
39. Indeed, the theory might alter the extent of these vices that one observes, as it is
widely agreed that observations are themselves often theory-laden. In KARL R. POPPER,
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 173-74 (2d
ed. 1965) Popper stated:
[T]here is no pure appearance or pure observation: what Berkeley had in mind
when he spoke of these things was always the result of interpretation, and . . .
it had therefore a theoretical or hypothetical admixture . . . . New theories,
moreover, may lead to re-interpretation of old appearances, and in this way
change the world of appearances.
40. See DINESH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON
CAMPUS 79 (1991) ("The basic difficulty is that, by and large, non-Western cultures have
no developed tradition of racial equality. Not only do they violate equality in practice, but
the very principle is alien to them, regarded by many with suspicion and contempt.").
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society?" Were the freedoms of belief and expression admired
and respected? 2 How tolerant are such societies of homosexuality
and other practices perceived as deviant?43 It is only by compar-
ing these societies to market societies that we can determine
whether the market does do better along these dimensions.
D. Values Encouraged by the Market
Given that market institutions can change our tastes and val-
ues, and mindful of the Internal Criticism Problem, the next ques-
tion is which values the market will encourage. The values that the
market will encourage might broadly be called "transactional vir-
tues" in that they will tend to serve a person well in the bulk of
the exchange transactions in which she engages. These values will
be encouraged, not only because market actors have to engage in
many transactions, but because the most fully assimilated members
of the market society generally will be those who have engaged in
those transactions with greatest frequency and success. The markets
will encourage constitutional values such as racial and religious tol-
erance, freedom of speech, and nonhegemonic human relations only
if those values can be shown to be transactional virtues in this
sense. Part II of the Article is devoted to demonstrating this con-
nection.'
41. See MICHAEL LEVIN, FEMINISM AND FREEDOM 91 (1987) (noting the token charac-
ter of female appointments to political positions in the former Communist regimes).
42. See ROY A. MEDVEDEV, ON SOCIALIsT DEMOCRACY 172-96 (1975) (discussing the
attitudes of Soviet censors).
43. See D'SOUZA, supra note 40, at 80:
It is perhaps pointless even to bring up the issue of non-Western attitudes
toward homosexuality or other "alternative lifestyles," which in various societies
are enough to warrant segregation, imprisonment, even capital punishment. In
Cuba, homosexuals are often thrown in jail and in China, they are sometimes
subjected to shock treatment which is credited with a high "cure rate."
44. Before showing the linkage between these values and market institutions, however,
I wish to acknowledge certain limitations on the scope of this project. While this Article
will seek to present some empirical evidence showing the correlations between the market
and certain values, the empirical task is so vast that these observations are only sugges-
tive. My goal is merely to present a plausible link between market institutions and certain
value systems.
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II. MARKETS AND SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
A. Free Expression
The First Amendment values of freedom of speech and of the
press serve many functions." They effectuate individual self-ex-
pression, check governmental abuse, and assist in the process of
democratic self-government.' However, one of the traditional val-
ues of freedom of speech has been its alleged role in promoting
the search for truth, often captured by the metaphor of an open
"marketplace of ideas."'47
It is possible-indeed, it seems likely-that there is a rela-
tionship between market institutions and our tastes for autonomous
self-expression and freedom from political tyranny. In this sec-
tion, however, I would like to concentrate on the more subtle link
between market institutions and the pursuit of truth.49 Ultimately,
the truth value may be the most important, since truth is the most
common justification for censorship. 0 By showing how free ex-
pression serves truth better than censorship, we avoid the need to
identify some value sufficiently weighty to categorically outweigh
truth in all circumstances. The question is why market institutions
cause us to place such a high value on truth, and why they cause
45. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
46. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 23 (1982)
(addressing the functions served by freedom of speech and of the press). See generally
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) (discussing the relationship between
free speech and self-government); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Free-
dom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978) (discussing the relationship between free
speech and autonomy); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (discussing the relationship between free speech and
checks on governmental abuse).
47. This phrase is generally traced to Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (commenting that since "time
has upset many fighting faiths" we should learn that "the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market").
48. An instinctive sense of this relationship may have deterred market reforms in the
Soviet Union. See ROBERT G. KAISER, RUSSIA: THE PEOPLE & THE POWER 386 (1976)
("The Soviet leaders may feel that fundamental economic reform would have unwelcome
political consequences.").
49. See infra notes 50-76 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Points & Punts, THE PRINCETON TORY, Oct. 1987, at 32 (discussing
Sandinista leader Nelba Blandon, who stated that "[La Prensa] accused us of suppressing
freedom of expression. This was a lie and we could not let them publish it.").
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us to downplay the harms that will result if error is allowed to
compete freely with truth in the marketplace of ideas."
In exploring markets and the value of truth, a conceptual
problem must be considered at the outset. It might be argued that
there is no single thing called "Truth," but rather a variety of
different truths pertaining to specific questions. Therefore, there is
no common denominator along which one can compare market and
nonmarket societies.52 Arguably, market societies place a high val-
ue on certain truths, such as how best to forecast trends in the
stock market, while nonmarket societies place a high value on
other truths, such as how best to promote social equity or to ad-
vance oneself in a state bureaucracy.
The objection that societies seek their own truths seems over-
drawn, however, because of the large number of concerns common
to both types of societies. In particular, the core technological and
economic problems of finding ways to use scarce resources to
advance human welfare are likely to be pertinent to any developed
society.53 For this reason, it does not seem conceptually incoherent
to inquire into the passion with which different societies are likely
to treat the quest for truth in answering these common questions.
Market societies are likely to place a considerable premium on
the pursuit of truthful conclusions about the potential of resources.
Individuals and firms who can recognize defects in the received or
customary wisdom of their community can derive personal profit
from their skepticism and independent rational inquiry. There are
two mechanisms of change: one operating at the individual level
and the other at the systemic level." At the individual level, each
market actor has an incentive to learn new truths about the poten-
tial use of resources that competitors have failed to perceive. 6 At
51. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Comm. Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.").
52. See Lawrence Alexander & Paul Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech Prin-
ciple, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1319, 1349 (1983) (suggesting that inquiries into which system
promotes "Truth" are meaningless because there is no one thing called "Truth").
53. See RICHARD G. LIPSEY Er AL., ECONOMICS 6-8 (7th ed. 1984) (discussing scarcity
and choice in the context of production possibilities).
54. See Christopher T. Wonnell, Contract Law and the Austrian School of Economics,
54 FORDHAM L. REv. 507, 518-23 (1986) (explaining how markets provide incentives to
acquire new knowledge pertinent to resource use).
55. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
56. See generally LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 53, at 206-09 (discussing invention and
innovation in the context of productivity).
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the systemic level, those market actors who do learn such truths
will expand and obtain a disproportionately large influence upon
the social environment from which constitutional values grow."
Of course, a nonmarket society could choose to reward entre-
preneurial insight, but it has often been the case that such societies
choose instead to create an atmosphere in which too much free
thinking is actively discouraged." Seeking the truth may be re-
garded as a desirable goal in the abstract, but most important truths
are likely to disrupt established habits, practices, and routines in
many painful or inconvenient ways. Without a powerful
systemwide profit-and-loss incentive structure for rewarding those
who break with traditional understandings, people who seek the
truth too aggressively are likely to be regarded as trouble-mak-
ers.
5 9
The value of truth alone, however, is not enough to explain a
market society's attitude toward the institution of free expression
and the marketplace of ideas. To the contrary, it might be thought
that truth is so important that error must be suppressed by censor-
ship techniques. What needs to be explained is not simply the
respect that market societies show for truth, but the tolerance they
are inclined to show toward error.
Of course, any real censorship regime is likely to block many
true ideas from being fully developed and aired. Like all cultural
phenomena, truths are the product of a rather unpredictable process
of people building upon the previous efforts of others. Thus, even
a social planner who is determined to promote what appear to be
the most promising ideas will make many mistakes.' Perhaps,
then, one could reach a conclusion that many errors must be toler-
ated if the marketplace of ideas is to arrive at the truth. Thus, the
market society's respect for truth alone is enough to explain its
hostility to censorship.
In fact, however, it appears to take more than a respect for
truth to produce a principled defense of free speech. The same
57. See ROBERT J. HEILBRONNER & JAMES K. GALBRAITH, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM
588-90 (rev. 8th ed. 1987) (discussing the power and social responsibility of large busi-
nesses).
58. See KAISER, supra note 48, at 331 ("[In Russiaj sticking by the old products and
production methods is the safe, easy way to get along. Innovation invites problems.").
59. See id. at 330-32 (emphasizing that following old production methods is the best
way to avoid trouble).
60. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 33 (1960) (describing
how developments flow from the process of adapting the tools or thoughts of others).
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marketplace of ideas that accelerates the discovery of truth is also
likely to accelerate other social processes, including the perfection
of believable myths of various kinds. The marketplace of ideas will
not only be cluttered with falsities; it will lead to the progressive
increase in the seductive power of those falsities, as various au-
thors who share common wishful thoughts work to remove the
most obvious problems with their theories.61 Something more is
needed to explain why a market society which reveres truth confi-
dently embraces a system that is capable of making falsity look so
inviting.
The primary factor in accounting for the spirit of tolerance is
the difference between the informational incentive structures of
private and collective decision making.62 It is a fundamental tenet
of public choice theory that collective actors have a rational incen-
tive to be strikingly uninformed.63 The likelihood that the collec-
tive decision will be different if any one person undertakes the
effort to become better informed is slight, while the benefits of a
wise collective decision (or the costs of an unwise one) are largely
externalized to persons other than the individual deciding whether
to become well informed. 4 Private action, by contrast, involves
more of a one to one correspondence between individual action
and final choice; costs are largely internalized (if market
entitlements are sensibly defined) to the actor deciding whether to
become informed.'
The dynamics of private markets greatly reduce the harm that
can be done by belief in some seductive falsehood. For example,
in a private market economy, it does not matter whether ninety
percent of the population believes that the best way to turn iron
ore into steel involves consulting an astrological chart. As long as
the proper techniques for doing so are available in the marketplace
of ideas, the decision makers, with their fortunes on the line, will
61. Wishful thinking has strong psychological roots. See SMITH, supra note 32, at 30
(1982) (stating that an individual's cognitive schemata often "reflect an idealized view of
how things ought to relate" rather than a faithful interpretation of reality).
62. See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
63. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 1971 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. So. 3, 11 (1971) (explaining that it is rational for voters to remain uninformed
on issues which have little or no direct effect on them personally).
64. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 38-
39 (1962) (discussing why an individual voter may rationally choose to stay uninformed).
65. Id.
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seek out that information and ignore the teachings of the astrolo-
gers and alchemists.
In a society where important decisions about resource use are
made collectively by actors with little incentive to fight their way
through attractive falsehoods, however, it becomes much more
important to assure that the marketplace of ideas is not allowed to
create and disseminate those falsehoods. In particular, people have
a frightful tendency to deny that some "X" which they favor on
other grounds is an obstacle to some "Y" which they also favor.'
Although tradeoffs between genuine goods are widespread, people
would much prefer to believe in the truth of the proposition that
"X is a cause of Y.',67 (Keynesian and supply-side promises that
higher spending and lower taxes will only stimulate and not
squeeze out private investment are good examples of this phenome-
non).6" Private actors have. a personal incentive to penetrate
through attractive myths and face painful tradeoffs; collective actors
are a much easier mark for the wishful thinkers in the marketplace
of ideas.
I do not mean to imply that censorship (or government propa-
ganda) would necessarily be desirable in a heavily collectivized
society. Censorship may be motivated not by a desire to keep the
populace from embracing seductive myths but rather to alter the
nature of the myths in which they believe. It might even be moti-
vated by a desire to keep the truth away from the public, espe-
cially if that truth concerned misdeeds by public officials. 9 Apart
from motivation, the clumsiness of 'government planning might
suggest that a censorship regime which tried to "fine-tune" the
66. See THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 150-53 (1980) [hereinafter
SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS] (investigating the impact of institutional incentives
on social rationality).
67. See id. at 150-52 (discussing political proclivity to deny inherent tradeoffs between
goods).
68. According to Keynesian theory, investment spending could be stimulated only by
general prosperity, so that government deficits, far from crowding out private investment,
would coax consumers into investing rather than hoarding their savings. See HEILBRONNER
& GALBRAITH, supra note 57, at 296-302 (discussing the use of deficits as a tool for
growth). The supply side theory claimed that lower taxes would generate so much more
productive effort that the deficit would actually be smaller, as the lower tax rate would
be applied to a larger tax base. See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 53, at 600-04 (examining
the paradox of thrift and the fiscal policies pursued by various administrations since
1968).
69. See Blasi, supra note 46, at 527 (explaining the importance of this motivation for
Constitutional theory).
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marketplace of ideas by excluding seductive falsehoods would do
more harm than good.7" However, the important point is that there
would be much more on the pro-censorship side of the balance in
a heavily collectivized society, making the most assimilated mem-'
bers of such a society nervous about constitutionalizing any free
speech counterprinciple.
Empirically, there has indeed been a close correlation between
market institutions and political liberties such as freedom of speech
and democracy.7' In the developed world, we are familiar with the
centrally-planned regimes and their extensive systems of censorship.
Charles Lindblom's study showed a high correlation between mar-
ket economies and traditional political freedoms.72 A broader em-
pirical perspective has recently been offered by Abbas Pourgerami
in Development and Democracy in the Third World.73 Professor
Pourgerami evaluated statistical associations among social, econom-
ic, and political performance variables in 104 Third World coun-
tries.7' He found a statistically significant correlation between mar-
ket orientation and political liberty.' For example, seventeen of
nineteen centrally-planned, Third World economies had politically
repressive regimes denying basic human rights.76 The correlation
between market institutions and toleration of free speech has indeed
been quite strong as an empirical as well as a theoretical manner.
B. Sanctity of Private Conscience
In addition to protecting freedom of speech, the First Amend-
ment to- the Constitution protects the free exercise of religion and
70. R. H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 354, 384-85 (1974) (drawing analogies between planning in the market for goods
and planning in the market for ideas); see also Aaron Director, The Parity of the Eco-
nomic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 10-11 (1964) (discussing unpredictable effects
when governments attempt to infringe upon personal liberties).
71. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
72. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 162 (1977) ("The polyarchies
are not only without exception market systems but specifically are private enterprise sys-
tems.").
73. ABBAS POUREGERAMI, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN THE THIRD WORLD
(1991).
74. Id. at xiii.
75. Id. at 79. As Pourgerami explains, "[t]he political indicators are indices of democ-
racy, freedom, humans [sic] rights, and liberty as developed and analyzed in previous
chapters. The MOEs [Market Oriented Economies] record the highest mean values of
political development with respect to all four indicators." Id. at 91.
76. Id. at 78-79.
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precludes Congress from establishing a religion.7 Together these
prohibitions seem to point to the principle that religion is a matter
of private conscience and that the state should not be in the busi-
ness of promoting a particular religion or preventing people from
believing in it.78
Of course, civil society requires that there be limits on the
extent to which people can act for reasons of religious con-
science.79 For example, the state cannot tolerate the murder of
other human beings on the purported command of a particular
religious teaching. However, actions do receive a certain amount of
constitutional protection: for example, the Supreme Court recently
held that the state could not target the religious practice of animal
sacrifice for prohibition."0
Similarly, constitutional protection often has been extended
under the banner of privacy to actions that are objectionable, if at
all, primarily because of the teachings of particular religions."
This includes the use of contraceptives82 and, for a minority of
the Court, the practice of homosexuality between consenting
adults.83 More controversially, constitutional protection has been
77. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
78. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1463 (11th ed. 1985):
Some commentators have suggested that the two religion clauses can be har-
monized by recognizing that "establishment" and "free exercise" serve a single
value-protecting the individual's freedom of religious belief and practices, with
"free exercise" barring the curbing of that freedom through penalties and "es-
tablishment" barring inhibitions on individual choice that arise from governmen-
tal aids and rewards to religion.
79. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Ex-
ercise Clause permits the state to prohibit sacramental peyote use and thus to deny unem-
ployment benefits to persons discharged for such use).
80. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). This is not to
say, however, that religious institutions would enjoy an immunity against general legisla-
tion designed to prevent cruelty to animals. Id. at 2226-28.
81. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
82. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut law for-
bidding use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intrudes upon the fight of marital privacy).
83. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that Georgia's sodomy
statute does not violate any fundamental fights of homosexuals). Professor Van Alstyne
asks the following question:
If "sodomy" is criminalized "because it is an abomination in the sight of God"
(according to the tenets of the religion dominantly of influence with the par-
ticular legislature criminalizing it), does not its criminalization thereby enact the
compulsory observance of the religious tenets of the dominant faith? Is this not
to establish a religion (i.e., its tenets) under secular auspices, enacting a theoc-
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extended to abortion, where the secular argument for the protection
of young life is mixed with religious views about the existence of
the soul at the moment of conception.'
It is this complex of values, which I have called the sanctity
of private conscience, that I would like to explore. How is it that
making religious belief and practice a private rather than a state
matter has come to seem natural to us? In particular, is there a
relationship between the institutions of a private market and our
tendency to embrace this value of private religious conscience?85
Some empirical support for the idea that markets and religious
freedom are correlated derives from the nineteenth century, which
of course was the peak period of market economics. The historian
Theodore Hamerow has written:
Until the nineteenth century, it was still taken for granted
that those who did not share the religious convictions of
the majority could not share its civic aspirations. Only after
1815 did Catholics in Protestant countries, Protestants in
Catholic countries, and Jews begin to achieve legal equali-
ty. In France, to be sure, Jewish emancipation had been
introduced as early as 1781, but elsewhere it came much
later: 1814 in the Netherlands, 1830 in Belgium, 1845 in
Norway, 1848 in Sweden, 1849 in Denmark, 1858 in Eng-
land, 1864 in Portugal, 1867 in Austria and Hungary, 1868
in Spain, 1869 in the North German Confederation, 1870 in
Italy, and 1874 in Switzerland.8 6
In exploring whether markets cause individuals to conceive of
religion as a private affair, it is helpful to focus upon the essential
strangeness, from the perspective of a religious believer, of the
theory that religion is a matter of private conscience." Suppose
that one has come to the firm conclusion that God has spoken to
racy on the installment plan?
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 873 n.45
(1991).
84. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that Texas' criminal abortion
statutes that prohibit abortion except to save the life of the mother are unconstitutional).
85. See Gail L. Heriot, The New Feudalism: The Unintended Destination of Contem-
porary Trends in Employment Law, 28 GA. L. REV. 167, 175-91 (1993) (exploring this
very question).
86. THEODORE S. HAMEROW, THE BIRTH OF A NEW EUROPE 418 (1983).
87. See Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion As A Hob-
by, 1987 DuKE LJ. 977, 978 (1987) (suggesting that liberalism prefers secular to religious
method, regarding religious belief as analagous to a private hobby).
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the world, that He prohibits certain actions and demands others,
and that He will save those who acknowledge Him and follow His
Commandments, while damning those who scorn His teaching.
The temptation for such a believer to use the weapons of the
state to inculcate this religious teaching would surely be very
strong. Indeed, it might be thought to be the height of selfishness
to leave one's fellow man free to walk into Hell when one is privy
to the teaching that will prevent this.8 Moreover, the religion it-
self might prohibit such a posture of selfishness and demand that
one do what one can to save others.89 Of course, a religion could
take the view that no one can be saved at the point of a gun. Still,
one might at least want to enlist the state to put enough resources
into the true religion to ensure that everyone had a thorough under-
standing of its tenets, so that he or she could make an informed
choice about whether to accept it.
Since the belief that religion is a private matter does not seem
to come about as a logical extension of an actual religious belief,
from where does it come? Once again, it is suggested that the
institution of a market economy, and the values it forms over years
and generations, make this seem to be a much more natural view
than logic itself would indicate.
An important dynamic is the incentive which markets provide
for all people, regardless of their religious beliefs, to evolve a
certain kind of public persona.' If my religion teaches me to
wage Holy War against infidels, or to be honest only with mem-
bers of the true faith, I am likely to have a very difficult time
finding firms of any size to voluntarily hire and retain me. Of
course, one might say that a true believer should accept this fate
and remain unemployed, but few people are saints who can entirely
resist secular counterincentives. Giving up one's religion may be
too high a price to pay for secular success, but moving that reli-
gion to a "private" part of one's self (indeed, creating the very
idea of a private part of one's self) may be a much more reason-
able price.
88. See generally LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD (R. Bruce Douglass et. al. eds., 1990)
(discussing, inter alia, whether liberalism can be reconciled with substantive visions of the
good).
89. See, e.g., Matthew 9:35 to 10:15 (charging the apostles to spread the word of
Christ).
90. See Heriot, supra note 85,. at 185-88 (arguing that private property and liberalism
discourage the use of private beliefs and tastes as proxies for quality of goods and ser-
vices because such use invades private spaces and disrupts the social fabric).
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As with different races,9' it may be that people from different
religions, when tossed together into the market system, begin with
quite different personal characters. Stereotypes about Jews, Mus-
lims, Catholics, Atheists, and Protestants, when those groups have
evolved in radically different environments, may have a certain
amount of factual basis, at least at the level of rough correla-
tions.' If these stereotypes impact upon productivity, the markets
will ruthlessly make the necessary religious discriminations."
However, over time one will observe these real distinctions
diminishing, as each group responds to the pressure to evolve the
generic market persona.' This assumes, of course, that the mar-
kets are permitted to operate, and that there is no attempt to force
associations against the wishes of one party.9' As certain members
of each group assimilate, it will become more costly to engage in
proxy discrimination, i.e., assuming that people of a particular
religion will exhibit certain productivity-related traits. 96
Indeed, one will come to know, respect, and economically
count on people of many religious persuasions. One will also come
to know, respect, and economically count on people who in private
pursue practices one believes to be religiously forbidden, such as
homosexual relations. Of course, it is possible for one to have
great respect and need for a person in one's public life and secret-
ly entertain a hatred for her and a conviction that she is headed for
eternal damnation, but the dissonance is evident.
91. See infra notes 171-83 and accompanying text (developing this iO ,a more fully).
92. See THOMAS SOwELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE 156-59 (1983)
[hereinafter SOwELL, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS] (arguing that certain cultural characteris-
tics persist despite effects of assimilation).
93. See infra notes 175-83 and accompanying text (discussing similar discrimination in
the racial context).
94. See SOWELL, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS, supra note 92, at 157 ("With the passing
of sufficient numbers of generations, substantial assimilation has nevertheless proceeded,
even among the overseas Chinese in Asia and the Jews in Europe.").
95. Forced associations could delay the assimilation process, as people come to realize
that they could obtain their desired economic positions by force rather than by pleasing
other transacting parties.
96. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Em-
ployment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1641 (1991) (noting
that if the assumptions upon which the discrimination is based are false, then employers
will abandon the assumptions). This is especially true if market actors are protected
against huge consequences from failing to look at these proxy variables, as they are when
relationships are at will. See Heriot, supra note 85, at 191-203 (noting that employment at
will allows employers to hire based on "gut reaction" rather than looking into employees'
personal preferences and opinions because they know that if the employees do not work
out they can be fired).
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That dissonance is made more severe by the pressures on mar-
ket actors not to display their hatreds. As discussed below, intoler-
ant managers and employees, unless they can somehow hold to-
gether a cartel, eventually will be forced to pay for the effects on
owners of that intolerance from their own pockets.97 The money-
making strategy of management is to treat religious convictions and
sacrilegious practices that do not interfere with productivity as
personal idiosyncracies that should not lead to any disrespect. One
can, of course, feign respect all day long and go home and vent
one's hatred, but a less taxing way of coping with the dissonance
might simply be to embrace religious tolerance as a personal val-
ue.
9 8
An additional dynamic concerns the myth-breaking tendencies
of markets noted in the earlier discussion of free expression. 9
Market actors have a demand for truth, and thus a demand for
valid methods of accessing truth, in their competitive endeavors.
Traditional religious methods of obtaining knowledge such as faith,
revelation, and authority are unlikely to be actively relied upon by
persons whose financial future depends upon their knowing the
factual world better than competitors do. Again, this pressure may
not result in market actors giving up their religious faiths, especial-
ly given the many important functions that those faiths serve for
them."° However, it is likely to create a view that religious
teaching is appropriate for the private sphere and that secular meth-
ods of obtaining knowledge should be used in the public sphere.
Over time, markets oversee the creation and deepening of the
public-private distinction. As people's religious beliefs and practices
(or lack of religious belief and sacriligious practices) become less
probative indicators of productivity, they come to be seen as "pri-
vate" matters. It also becomes regarded as bad business, and ulti-
mately as bad taste, to take an aggressive interest in the private
behavior of others. Moreover, the public sphere becomes a sphere
of secular methods, even if one is in the business of producing
religious materials. Market actors simply lose the habit of carrying
97. See infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 18-31 and accompanying text (discussing dissonance and resulting
change in values).
99. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
100. These functions would include providing consolation to people about their own
death or suffering and that of their loved ones, as well as the social function of en-
couraging people to behave decently toward each other.
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out religious teaching in the manner that a consistent and logical
application of doctrine might indicate would be warranted. 1
An interesting feature of this dynamic is that market societies
rarely offer an explanation of religion's role that is in keeping with
the actual effect of markets upon religion. Markets privatize reli-
gion; they do not eliminate it (or at least they do not eliminate it
nearly as rapidly as they privatize it). As a result, the ideologies of
market societies must continue to appeal to people who accept, at
one level of their being, the teachings of religion. The idea that
religion might be a functional myth that promotes personal welfare
but that it is still a myth which must not be permitted to interfere
with public matters is hardly an ideology likely to appeal to the
religious believer. It is extremely unlikely to appear in Supreme
Court opinions discussing the role of the religion clauses of the
Constitution; indeed, it might reasonably be thought that for judges
to invoke such premises in an argument would itself violate the
religion clauses.
Instead, market societies have evolved the idea of the priority
of the Right over the Good; i.e., that the resources of the commu-
nity are to be distributed so as to give each person a fair chance to
pursue his or her own vision, and that the fair entitlements of
others constrain what any one person can properly do to promote
the good or pious society.'0 2 The skeptic can buy into the liberal
compromise for the kinds of utilitarian reasons given above.
Whether a religious believer should logically be willing to place
the Good in a subordinate position to the Right has often been
doubted. 3 As a factual matter, however, many religious believers
in market societies do indeed seem to be willing to embrace such a
101. One counter-tendency should be noted here. In many circumstances, religion has
served as a conservative force, preaching traditional restraints upon activism that might
upset an established social order. This tendency was strong in the 19th century, and was
largely responsible for the upper classes retaining at least a surface devotion to religious
teaching. See HAMEROW, supra note 86, at 255 (noting that belief in the church rein-
forced a distrust in the proletariat in Europe). On the other hand, the general seculariza-
tion of the masses under the market economy was probably accelerated by such religious
conservatism. European Church attendance "diminished steadily as industrialization began
to nurture new attitudes and beliefs among the urban proletariat." Id. Indeed, it appeared
to one historian that over the course of that century, "a society that was essentially indif-
ferent to religion began to emerge in Europe." Id.
102. See JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 446-52 (1971) (contrasting the concepts
of the Right and the Good).
103. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN
DIEjO L. REv. 763, 767-70 (1993) (discussing how religious beliefs affect policy deci-
sions).
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view, or at least to live peacefully within a society that embraces
it. Whether logical or not, such a view appears to fit quite well
with the incentives of market actors.
C. Nonhegemonic Personal Relations
1. Introduction
A constitutional value with many apparent faces is the distaste
for "hegemonic personal relations." By this phrase, I mean relation-
ships in which one person can, at her discretion, choose to impose
great harm upon another, with the result that the other must act
with great deference toward the party empowered to impose that
targeted harm. The most direct manifestation of the taste for
nonhegemonic human relations is probably the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, outlawing slavery and involuntary
servitude, except as punishment for crimes."° This Amendment
has been held to prohibit certain practices even if maintained with-
out benefit of state action.'
The taste for nonhegemonic human relations also appears in
numerous constitutional provisions designed to protect the individ-
ual citizen against the targeted actions of state officials. The prohi-
bition on bills of attainder is a clear example."° While takings of
property and impairments of contract rights theoretically could take
the form of broad and general legislative language, the courts have
shown special solicitude when the statutes appeared to have a
targeted focus against one individual or narrow group. 7 Distrust
of state actions against individuals is also manifest in the
protections accorded the criminal accused, many of which are de-
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
105. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (holding that Con-
gress has authority from the enabling clause to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment by
"appropriate legislation" including the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisi-
tion of property).
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.").
107. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980) (stating that in assessing the
fairness of a zoning ordinance the court will look to whether the burden is placed on
property owners as a whole or on one individual); Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978) (holding that a state-mandated pension funding
change violated the contract clause of the Constitution).
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signed to ensure that objective evidence supports the state
administrator's assertion of criminal guilt."°8 Similar values appear
to be behind procedural due process rights such as the right to a
hearing before important interests are administratively terminat-
ed.10
9
2. Market Protection From Oppression: Theoretical Correlations
a. Markets and Individualized Harmings
The question, once again, is where the values implicit in the
Constitution come from, and more specifically, whether market
institutions work to create an environment which makes those
values appear natural and reasonable. It is important to investigate
the source of the value of avoiding individualized harm because
there is a sense in which the value is quite illogical. In a world of
economic scarcity, whatever one individual consumes is necessarily
removed from the grasp of another individual. The idea that one
individual should rarely be placed in a position to harm another
individual seems rather illogical in that setting.
There are, of course, numerous harmings that occur in market
activity. Each consumer harms other consumers by buying the
product and thus bidding up the price. Similarly, each producer
harms competing producers by purchasing inputs and bidding up
their price, and by supplying outputs and bidding down their price.
The most notable feature of these harms, however, is the relative
scarcity of human relations attached to the harms."0 The consum-
ers who harm each other with their purchases are not tied together
in ongoing human relations; the effects are indirect and remote.
To a lesser extent, business firms also are cut off from ongo-
ing personal relations with competitors; their ongoing relations are
more likely to be with creditors, customers, employees, and others
in contractual privity with them. The common law refusal to en-
force direct restraints of trade between competitors, and the anti-
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. V & VI.
109. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970) (holding that due process rights
require a hearing before termination of welfare benefits).
110. See Christopher T. Wonnell, The Primacy of Cooperation, Rational Bargaining, and
an Economic Theory of Part of the Common Law, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771,
777-78 (1992) (commenting that a contract benefits the parties but harms the competitors
of those parties).
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trust prohibitions against collusive behavior, further weaken the
human ties between competitors.'"
It is true that certain market settings can create distasteful
human relations among competitors. For example, within a firm,
people who compete for promotions must work together on an
ongoing basis until the promotion decision is made; this can create
bitterness and dysfunctional strategic behavior. In an oligopolistic
industry, firms may target each other with predatory actions and
industrial espionage." Although not really a market phenomenon
(since market entitlements against force are not being respected),
the violence of union members against "scab" replacements is
another example of personalized oppression of one competitor by
another.113
In general, however, the striking thing about market harmings
is how divorced they are from ongoing, hostile human relation-
ships. If the number of firms is large enough, there may not even
be much dislike of any one competitor by any other. Individual
consumers rarely hate each other for bidding up prices; individual
farmers rarely hate each other for bidding down prices. In more
concentrated industries, the dislike of individual competitors is
more evident, but the market provides few tools for actually inter-
acting with those competitors. Daily life in a concentrated industry
may be spent thinking about and metaphorically warring with com-
petitors; unlike real war, however, one is generally not engaged in
continuing physical interactions with the persons with whom one
competes.
b. The Employment Relationship
There are, of course, numerous market interactions with per-
sons whose interests conflict with one's own. Some of these re-
lations, such as employer and employee, take the form of rather
hierarchical relations of command and obedience. There is no ten-
111. See generally Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161 (N.J. 1978) (discussing the com-
mon law tradition in employment contracts).
112. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 373-84
(1985) (analyzing the rationality of predatory conduct against competitors).
113. See generally Christopher T. Wonnell, Tile Influential Myth of a Generalized Con-
flict of Interests Between Labor and Management, 81 GEO. L.J. 39 (1992) [hereinafter
Wonnell, The Influential Myth] (concluding that such anti-competitive behavior is individu-
ally rational for the actors involved, but not collectively rational for the working class as
a whole).
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dency for markets to minimize the amount of hierarchy in this
sense because such hierarchy often produces a surplus in the form
of additional product that can inure to the benefit of both transact-
ing parties.I1
4
What the market does tend to minimize is the degree of gratu-
itous oppression that often accompanies hierarchical relation-
ships." 5 Petty slights and power plays greatly decrease the sub-
jective utility of the relationship to the victimized party; to secure
her voluntary consent, it would be necessary to offer additional
compensation to endure such behavior."6 A certain amount of un-
pleasantness is, of course, inherent in hierarchy, so the
maintainance of hierarchy itself would constitute gratuitous oppres-
sion in any case where the physical product was not enhanced by
hierarchical structures."7
The market affects hierarchial structures by punishing those
who oppress others gratuitously. Many managers undoubtedly de-
rive subjective utility from asserting their own power; it is one of
the least attractive aspects of human nature. However, these power
plays are costly to owners, since they make the working environ-
ment more hostile and reduce the number of quality employees
willing to work at any given salary level."' If the managers are
themselves the owners, their financial self-interest will directly dis-
cipline their oppressive tendencies. If the managers are not owners,
the owners will have an incentive to monitor managerial miscon-
duct and to bond managers to owners by their compensation pack-
age. Owners who are unable to discipline their managers will lose
competitively to those who are able to do so. Surviving firms will
tend to have managers who confine their gratuitous oppression.
Managers could resist this dynamic only if they could hold
together an effective cartel." 9 As long as some managers are
114. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 112, at 206-15 (discussing attempts by more radical
economists to deny the link'between hierarchy and productivity).
115. See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
116. RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMrrH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 251-52
(3d ed. 1988) (discussing how employers with worse working conditions will have to pay
more to retain employees).
117. See Armen A. AIchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AMER. ECON. REV. 777-95 (1972) (noting that it is a delusion
to believe that firms settle issues by authority superior to that of the environmental mar-
ket; rather, firms are distinguished from the conventional market by the use of a central-
ized contractual agent in a team production process).
118. See EHRENBERG & SMrrH, supra note 116, at 251-52.
119. See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (discussing necessity of cartels in
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willing to confine their oppressive behavior, however, it will be-
come increasingly costly to retain one's habits and the attitudes
that support them.'20 Over time, the ethic of markets is that a
good manager is a good "people person," not in the sense of altru-
istic self-denial, but in the sense of sensitivity to readily avoidable
pain of those with whom one works.'2'
c. Other Market Relations
The point can be generalized beyond employment to all mar-
ket relations. In a market society, one has an incentive to learn
what kinds of pain are being inflicted by one's conduct on others,
and to minimize those forms of pain which are not essential for
the promotion of one's purposes. Sales people are taught to say
"have a nice day" to customers, even if they cannot stand to look
at them. One can, of course, feign a concern for the welfare of
consumers. As anyone who has purchased products can attest,
however, it is often possible to tell when an employee has no
genuine concern for the customer's inconveniences. Especially if
the sales person is an owner or is closely monitored by owners,
the most reliable way to appear concerned is often to become
concerned.
3. Market Protection From Oppression: Empirical Evidence
As always, one is tempted to accept the logic but to argue
that these conclusions are contradicted by experience. Employers do
engage in petty acts of oppression; sales clerks are indifferent to
the inconveniences of customers and patently insincere in their
flattery. There are two problems with this argument. The first has
been noted earlier, i.e., its narrowness of empirical vision. It
ignores the basic human proclivity for personal indifference toward
the race context).
120. See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY
39 (1968) (noting the instability of cartels); John S. McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Confer-
ences and the American Merchant Marine, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 191, 196-204 (1960) (dis-
cussing the difficulty of maintaining an effective cartel with reference to the Ocean
Freight Rate Conferences).
121. See Gerald Graham, Keeping in Touch Means Listening to Employees As Well as
Customers, ORLANDO SENTINAL-TRIB., Nov. 14, 1981, at BI (arguing that successful man-
aging requires that respectful attention be paid to employee concerns).
122. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Internal Criticism
Problem).
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the welfare of others, and fails to look at human relations outside
the civilizing ambit of market pressures.
Human beings are almost certainly biologically predisposed to
a significant degree of self-preference. Each person is both a survi-
vor and the descendant of a very long line of survivors. Altruism
for kin is one thing; a generalized concern for the welfare of each
person with whom one interacts is quite another." Given this
biological reality, one would expect many human interactions
among strangers to be rather cold and opportunistic. One need only
travel in .nonmarket societies such as Russia to realize how un-
pleasantly bureaucratic, gray, and uncaring human relations between
strangers can be when they are not disciplined by market incentives
to behave decently.24 As always, the market is faulted by internal
critics for failing to fully match the tastes it inspires; the Internal
Criticism Problem arises when one uses that fact to assume that
market societies must present more oppressive personal relations
than others."
The second problem with the argument that hegemonic or
oppressive personal relations empirically continue or increase under
capitalism is that relevant tradeoffs are being neglected. It is true
that some non-market institutions such as public bureaus and public
universities can be pleasant places to work, in part because there is
no irritating superior constantly cracking the whip to increase
productivity.'26 If such superiors do attempt to assert themselves,
a civil servant or tenured professor can feel a certain confidence in
her ability to talk back without being fired if she is confronted
with arrogance or overbearing behavior.'" Because capitalist firms
are usually hierarchies and take their hierarchies seriously, and
123. See Dennis Krebs, The Challenge of Altruism in Biology and Psychology, in
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 81, 92 (Charles Crawford et al. eds., 1987) (noting that
since individuals share genes with their relatives, individuals can get their genes into
subsequent generations by helping relatives).
124. See, e.g., Howard Witt, The Big Mac Revolution, CHI. TRiB., July 25, 1993 (Mag-
azine), at 10 (noting how the Moscow McDonald's creates a high quality of service in
contrast to other Moscow restaurants which have indifferent waiters).
125. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Internal Criticism
Problem).
126. See CHANGING JOBS: A HANDBOOK FOR LAwYERS IN THE 1990's 295 (Heidi L.
McNeill ed. 1994) (noting the relaxed environment in which law professors work because
there is little supervison).
127. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment,"
99 YALE L.J. 251, 260 (1989) (discussing the elaborate payment procedures required to
dismiss tenured faculty).
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because a certain amount of power politics is inevitable with hier-
archies, those firms are experienced as more oppressive than many
other work settings.
The flaw in this reasoning is quite evident. Government bu-
reaus and public universities are subsidized institutions. 2 ' They
can afford to run with considerable slack, failing to take advantage
of physical productivity considerations, because they are siphoning
resources from other sectors of the economy. 29 The fallacy is to
assume that what is possible for a dependent sector must be possi-
ble more generally.
If the market economy were superseded, public enterprises
would have no place from which to obtain resources; they would
be forced to produce whatever value they sought to disseminate to
their employees. As long as hierarchy leads to physical efficiencies,
these public institutions would be compelled to choose between
reinstating serious hierarchies or impoverishing the workers by their
absence. Most nonmarket societies have in fact needed to do a
combination of these two things, so that the proletariat is both
impoverished and oppressed by arrogant superiors.30 Such serious
hierarchies without market discipline to civilize them can be ugly
institutions indeed. 13'
Of course, there are many historical examples of truly oppres-
sive relationships in predominantly market societies. Indentured
servants voluntarily opted to bind themselves to service for periods
from four to seven years as a way of financing their ocean passage
to the United States.'32 Those relations were quite cruel, involving
seventy-two hour weeks of backbreaking labor, threats of
whippings to discipline the disobedient, and conditions that were
often disease-infested and life-threatening for the servants.'33
128. See, e.g., Alan D. Miller, Colleges Push for Funding, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June
15, 1993, at IA (noting that Ohio State University received $331.1 million from the state
in 1992).
129. See, e.g., Summary of Report on the State U, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1985, at B6
(discussing the State University of New York's waste of tax dollars because of inefficient
organization).
130. See PAUL JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES: THE WORLD FROM THE TWENTIES TO THE
EIGHTIES 466-505 (1983) (recounting the tragic history of postwar socialist regimes in the
Third World).
131. See id.
132. See ABBOT E. SMITH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE: WHITE SERVITUDE AND CONVICT
LABOR IN AMERICA 1607-1776 (1947) (discussing the motivations of those who entered
into indentured servitude).
133. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM 180-82
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While the decision to become an indentured servant may have
been a rational one for many of the servants, who faced neither a
present nor a future in a Malthusian Europe,'" the oppressive
character of the relation was evident. Not only was it immensely
painful to be treated like property; it was also difficult for the
master to obtain the willing cooperation of the servant to do more
than was directly ordered and monitored.' The transaction costs
of such servitude made it ill-suited to most purposes, and markets
would accordingly have an incentive to replace it with at-will
relationships where serious oppression could be met by exiting the
relation. This was indeed done, long before the Thirteenth
Amendment's formal ban on involuntary servitude. 3 '
Slaves were of course brought to the United States and treated
as property without having given their consent to the relationship.
Unlike indentured servitude, slavery can be characterized as anti-
thetical to market institutions because it violates the entitlement of
self-ownership. However, it is also tru.e that markets have an incen-
tive to liquidate the institution of slavery (and of feudal serfdom
and peonage), even if one begins with evil entitlements to obtain
the work of others. Under slavery, punishment can make people
perform a routine and readily observable task. In a changing world,
however, the productivity of an individual will tend to be higher if
that individual is entrepreneurial, i.e., alert to new opportunities for
productive labor in her environment and willing to take initiative to
bring those opportunities to fruition. 37 Since self-owned individu-
(1975) (discussing the high incidence of disease in 17th century Virginia); A. Roger
Ekirch, Bound for America: A Profile of British Convicts Transported to the Colonies, 42
WM. & MARY Q. 184 (1985) (discussing the transportation of British convicts to Ameri-
ca, most of whom were sold as servants).
134. See ANTHONY BIMBA, THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 11
(1927) (discussing the grim conditions in 18th century Europe); Farley Grubb, Fatherless
and Friendless: Factors Influencing the Flow of English Emigrant Servants, 52 J. ECON.
HtST. 85, 95 (1992).
135. See THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND ECONOMICS 11-15 (1975) [hereinafter SOWELL,
RACE AND ECONOMICS] (noting that slaves were more productive when allowed to exer-
cise individual initiative and that there were limits on the economic benefits that could be
derived from the punishment of slaves).
136. See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR 164-70 (1991) (noting
that for indentured servitude to be successful, there had to be a consensus among employ-
ers that it was legitimate, and that by the 1820s this consensus had eroded with respect
to white workers in the United States).
137. See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 35 (1973) ("It is
this entrepreneurial element that is responsible for our understanding of human action as
active, creative, and human rather than as passive, automatic, and mechanical.").
42919951
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
als have greater entrepreneurial productivity than slaves, slaves will
frequently be willing and able to purchase their own freedom with
the surplus that is created.1
38
The proclivity of markets to mitigate the severity and reduce
the scope of slavery tends to be forgotten because of the under-
standable tendency to focus upon the experience of black slavery
in the United States. As an indicator of the tendencies of markets,
that experience is misleading because the state governments in the
old South prohibited manumission by contract.'39 To look at the
effect of markets uninhibited by such regulatory measures, it may
be helpful to look at slavery in ancient Rome where state restric-
tions, although not wholly absent, were less significant. 40
In Rome, masters often gave skilled slaves an interest in the
profits of their endeavors, and the peculium, which was accumulat-
ed in this way, provided the means of purchasing
emanicipation. 4' A particularly common form of manumission
was by testamentary means, in which a master's will would direct
that on his death his slaves would be freed either immediately or
subject to conditions. 2 One estimate is that over eighty per cent
of the population of Rome were either freedmen or descended from
freedmen. "
While the conditions of the slave class in Rome varied great-
ly, it has been suggested that the conditions of slaves improved
over time, becoming in many cases more like serfs, not free to
leave but able to work independently.' Many slaves became
138. See THOMAS SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES 96 (1981) [hereinafter SOWELL,
MARKETS AND MINORITIES] (noting that in a theoretically perfect economy, a slave would
be more valuable as a free man and that only that slave himself can know his value as a
free man).
139. See id. at 96-99 (discussing societies where there were various financial processes
by which slaves could purchase their freedom).
140. See id. at 96 ("In the ancient Greek and Roman world, it was well understood that
the maximum economic gain to be made from an individual was by selling him his free-
dom.").
141. See SAMUEL DILL, ROMAN SOCIETY FROM NERO TO MARCUS AURELIUS 117-18
(1956) (describing master/slave relationships, slaves' responsibilities, and how slaves might
earn their freedom).
142. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 73 (1962).
143. Id. at 72.
144. See THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD 215 (John A. Garraty & Peter Gay
eds., 1972) (noting the improvement in the position of slaves for economic and humani-
tarian reasons).
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trusted partners of their masters and -were able to retain a large
portion of the profits from their efforts.'45
Some law and economics writers have suggested that the
greater efficiency of free labor over slave labor, at least in situa-
tions involving entrepreneurial judgment, is a good public policy
reason against slavery.'46 Since transactions would eventually
bring about the liquidation of slavery, one saves transaction costs
by beginning with a self-ownership entitlement.'47 Others have
criticized this view for implying that the case against slavery is
somehow dependent upon empirical notions, when the institution so
patently offends the imperative of equal dignity.'48 The present
point, however, uses the basic economic insight for descriptive and
not normative purposes.
If markets are permitted to operate, they will gradually remove
institutions that involve gratuitous hierarchies and abusive human
relations. Especially as the rate of societal change accelerates, the
number of purely repetitive tasks where the optimal level of perfor-
mance given adequate human effort is well known is likely to
decline. Over time, institutions such as slavery, servitude, and
vassalage would then be more rare, and their continued existence
and manifest cruelty in certain places would seem increasingly
anomalous and unnatural. It can hardly be coincidence that the
greatest of all market societies, nineteenth century Britain, played
such an instrumental role in the removal of slavery from the earth;
it is a logical role for a people whose values had become attuned
to the institutions that had survived in open markets.'49 Nor is it
coincidental that twentieth century regimes which turned against the
free market, such as Cambodia, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union,
and the People's Republic of China, have reintroduced forced labor
on a grand scale.5
145. See DILL, supra note 141, at 118-19.
146. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Divorkin and
Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 246-47 (1980) (arguing that transaction costs are mini-
mized by making workers free and assigning them the right to their labor in the first
place, rather than making workers slaves who must earn their freedom).
147. See id. (explaining that there are costs associated with purchasing freedom that are
not incurred if the individual is free from the beginning).
148. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 211 (1980)
("[A] theory that makes the moral value of slavery depend on transaction costs is gro-
tesque.").
149. See Stanley L. Engerman, Contract Labor, Sugar and Technology in the Nineteeth
Century, 43 J. ECON. HIsT. 635 (1983) (discussing the end of slavery in the British colo-
nies of the Caribbean).
150. See JOHNSON, supra note 130, at 274, 417-18, 549-51, 654-57 (describing specific
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D. Equal Treatment
1. Markets, Race, and Gender: Theoretical Correlations
The final, and perhaps most controversal, constitutional value I
will consider is that of equal treatment. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution requires that no state "deny to any per-
son . . . the equal protection of the laws.'' The question for
this section is whether markets weaken racist and sexist tendencies
and promote the idea of equal treatment.
First, we must draw a distinction between two types of prefer-
ences. One is the pure preference for avoiding market relations, or
at least market relations on terms of equality or subordination, with
members of a particular race or gender. The second is a preference
for avoiding market relations, or at least market relations on terms
of equality or subordination, with persons who exhibit certain be-
havioral patterns that correlate with race and gender.52 To make
these two categories of preferences mutually exclusive, I will limit
the second category to accurate perceptions of genuine correlations
between race or gender and some behavioral trait. A person who
exaggerates the extent of the correlations, or who imagines a corre-
lation to obtain that in fact does not, is indulging in the first,
purely racist or sexist, behavior.'53
Given the world's sordid history in race and gender rela-
tions, 154 one would expect the pure tastes for racism and sexism,
including the tastes for erroneous factual beliefs that are pleasing to
racial and gender vanity, to be quite pervasive.'55 However, it ap-
pears that market institutions will discipline and ultimately weaken
these human predispositions.
First, the monetary bottom line places significant constraints
upon the indulgence of objectives which fail to maximize profits.
examples of the use of forced labor under 20th century regimes which have turned
against the free market).
151. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
152. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongfid Discrimination Wrong?, 141 U. PA.
L. REv. 149 (1992) (analyzing these and related distinctions among preferences).
153. See generally Christopher T. Wonnell, Circumventing Racism: Confronting the
Problem of the Affirmative Action Ideology, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 95, 96-102 [hereinafter
Wonnell, Circumventing Rascism] (providing a definition of racism).
154. See infra notes 187-89, 238-40 and accompanying text (discussing the eternal prob-
lems of race and gender discrimination).
155. See Wonnell, Circumventing Racism, supra note 153, at 102-18 (discussing racism
and strategies for its circumvention).
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Other things being equal, managers and employees might want the
firm to discriminate, so that they would not have to supervise,
work alongside, or take orders from members of the disfavored
gender or ethnic group. However, managers and employees are
constrained by external actors who are likely to be much less con-
cerned with personal considerations of this kind-namely, consum-
ers and capitalists.'56
In many cases, consumers will not even know the racial or
gender make-up of the persons who produced the product in ques-
tion. Those who produce the better product at the lowest price,
because they hired the most productive employees without regard
to race and gender, will thus receive rewards from unknowing (and
perhaps racist and sexist) consumers.'57 Even when consumers do
know about the racial and gender composition of the firm produc-
ing a product, the question remains whether they will be willing to
pay an appreciable premium because of their prejudices; such a
premium is almost a pure cost to the consumer, who derives only
the thinnest of vicarious satisfactions from having indulged her
racism or sexism. 8
Capitalist owners are also likely to exert pressure upon manag-
ers and employees who are inclined to pursue racist or sexist ob-
jectives at the expense of profitability. 9 Of course, in the mod-
em public corporation managers have a certain degree of distance
from the concerns of owners,"a but this difference should not be
exaggerated. To bond themselves to the owners, managers are
routinely compensated in ways directly tied to the share prices of
the firm.' Moreover, the' market's quasi-Darwinian survival ten-
dencies remain at work. Firms staffed by managers who pursue
their own racial or gender tastes (or those of their employees) at
156. See WALTER WiLLAMs, Tim STATE AGAINST BLACKS 27 (1982).
157. See Strauss, supra note 96, at 1640 (stating that employers who do not use inac-
curate generalizations about minority employees gain a competitive advantage).
158. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 60-72 (1992) (stressing the difference
between employment and other relational markets, where race consciousness might contin-
ue, and spot markets such as the market for consumer products, where it would be thor-
oughly weeded out by markets); see also infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the problem of genuine correlations that impact upon relational markets).
159. See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
160. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) (providing a classic statement of this problem).
161. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 10 (1991) (explaining the use of value-of-stock based compensation
for bonding cororate officers).
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the expense of profitability will find it harder to make the sales
needed for internal financing and harder to raise capital needed for
external financing. Over time, such firms will be less inclined to
grow than others similarly situated, and indeed more inclined to
find themselves unable to pay creditors and stay out of bankrupt-
cy.
162
The same is true of false beliefs about the productivity of
women and minorities. While those false beliefs might bring a
certain pleasure to the vanity of managers, they will be interfering
with the monetary profitability of the firm. Owners will have an
incentive to install managers who see the world accurately.161
Moreover, even if owners never monitored managers, the Darwin-
ian process would result in the success of those firms that were
managed by people who could see the world accurately.
However, racism and sexism, including racist and sexist be-
liefs, might not be in tension with profitability. If managers and
employees hold racist or sexist tastes, the owner might lose highly
valued employees if she insisted on hiring minorities or women for
jobs thought unsuitable. 1" The gain in productivity from hiring
the most productive worker, regardless of race or gender, would be
counterbalanced by the loss of the talents of the bigoted. 65
This scenario, however, is not stable. Employees and managers
are not all equally bigoted."6 Because firms that discriminate are
forgoing valuable talent, there will be an incentive for owners to
seek out relatively tolerant "cartel breaking" employees and manag-
ers and offer them wage premiums. 67 There will be attempts to
hold the cartel of bigots together by bringing social pressure to
bear upon the tolerant, but if there is one thing well established in
economics, it is the great instability of cartels.161 If nations or re-
162. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS, supra note 66, at 113.
163. Id. at 9.
164. See Strauss, supra note 96 at 1622 (arguing that the additional cost of additional
wages or reduced productivity of bigoted employees forced to work with minorities must
be subtracted from the productivity of the minority workers).
165. Id.
166. See Gary S. Becker, An Economic Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 129, 136 (Walter E. Block & Michael
A. Walker eds., 1982) (pointing out that African-American owners can benefit from the
discriminatory policies of white firms because they can then hire highly qualified African-
American laborers at sub-market rates).
167. See id. (discussing the detrimental effects of discrimination on white owners of
capital despite the beneficial effects for white laborers).
168. See SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES, supra note 138, at 36-39 (discussing the
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gions of a particular nation differ in the extent of their tolerance or
their ability to hold together racist cartels, the more tolerant regions
will prosper, because they can hire the more productive employees,
regardless of race and gender, without losing the talents of others.
Once again, surviving firms will be disproportionately staffed with
relatively tolerant individuals.
Economic theory would suggest that the only stable equilibri-
um will be reached when bigoted employees pay for their bigotry
by accepting lower wages commensurate with the costs that their
intolerance imposes upon the owner. 69 For the reasons noted in
the introduction, however, it hardly seems likely that this "equilib-
rium" situation would in fact be stable, once the economist's arbi-
trary assumption of exogenous preferences is removed. 7 If bigots
are forced to pay the cost of their intolerance from their own pock-
et, will there not be pressure on people to become more tolerant?
When tolerance correlates with wealth, will it not be increasingly
regarded as progressive and dignified to refrain from discrimina-
tion?
This argument only applies to the first kind of preferences,
i.e., a pure racism or sexism, including a taste for inaccurate fac-
tual beliefs that are pleasing to racial or gender vanity. It is not ar-
gued that free markets would remove the problem of valid empir-
ical correlations between race or gender and productivity-related
traits, many of which may be the product of past discriminations
and injustices.' On the contrary, one would expect market actors
to be quite sensitive to any such valid empirical correlations, and
to resist any "politically correct" ideologies that attempted to wish
such correlations away.
Having said this, however, it is not true that free markets cre-
ate no incentives that would tend to eliminate this second category
instability of cartels even when the cartel members have exceptionally powerful forces on
their side, as with white landowners facing black sharecroppers after the Civil War).
169. See Walter E. Block & Michael A. Walker, Introduction to DISCRIMINATION, AF-
FIRMATIVE ACTION, AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 166, at 9-10.
170. And, indeed, it does not appear that the "taste for discrimination" actually leads
people to expend much money to indulge this taste. Walter Williams has argued that such
a strong taste would be incompatible with data showing that black women college gradu-
ates earn substantially more than their white counterparts. Walter Williams, On Discrimi-
nation, Prejudice, Racial Income Differentials, and Affirmative Action, in DISCRIMINATION,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 166, at 72.
171. See Strauss, supra note 96, at 1628 (suggesting that if there is actually a correla-
tion between race and productivity, it results at leart partly from a history of discrimina-
tion as well as unequal educational opportunities).
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of tastes. Suppose that Ethnic Group X has a penchant to engage
in workplace brawls with co-workers. The initial effect will be for
the wage rate of Group X members to be bid down relative to
members of other groups, reflecting the productivity losses from
fights. It is impossible to believe, however, that this would be an
equilibrium state of affairs, unless the taste for fighting was indeli-
bly burned into the genetic constitution of Group X, which is most
unlikely.
First, not all Group X members will be equally given to fight-
ing. Non-fighters will face the problem that their membership in
Group X will serve as an inexpensive proxy upon which their
employer may choose not to hire them.' In a free market, how-
ever, contractual terms can be varied to signal the inapplicability of
the stereotypes to a particular person. An individual could effec-
tively bond herself against these pressures by consenting to a com-
pensation scheme of low wages together with bonuses for proven
performance or an at-will employment regime that gave employers
confidence that they would not be stuck with a troublemaking
employee.' Once in the door, the individual's track record
would serve as a method of differentiating herself from the others
in Group X. 74
It might be argued that individual employees do not have the
bargaining power to change the terms of employment that employ-
ers are generally offering to employees. Such active one-on-one
dickering of terms need not, however, be the engine of change.
Some firms will have compensation schemes consisting of delayed
compensation or at-will employment. These will be the firms at
which employers and nonstereotypical members of Group X will
see great potential in contracting with each other. If the device
172. Richard Epstein has argued that the use of proxies should not persist in equilib-
rium because the first firms that use the proxies will gradually remove from the pool the
non-fighting members outside Group X, such that a new employer would obtain no infor-
mation from using membership in Group X as a proxy for fighting. See EPSTEIN, supra
note 158, at 31-41. Epstein's argument is intriguing, but does appear to depend upon the
earlier use of race as a proxy.
173. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMItC ANALYSIS OF LAW 116 (1986) (discussing use
of penalty clause in contract to convince other contracting party of reliability). In many
contexts, agreeing to a piecework arrangement would be another way to signal one's high-
er-than-average productivity.
174. See Strauss, supra note 96, at 1642 (noting that a major source of correct infor-
mation about an individual comes from hiring him or other members of his minority
group, allowing the correct information to supersede the erroneous assumptions made
about the productivity of members of the minority group).
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works, those firms will succeed in the competitive marketplace as
against others, so that a change which did not occur by bargaining
would occur by differential selection instead.
As more and more members of Group X see that they could
prosper by refraining from their group's traditional 'predisposition
toward fighting, the pressures for further change would be evident.
Remaining proxy-bias would surely motivate the more assimilated
members of Group X to put social pressure on the less assimilated
members to change their habits.175 Eventually, Group X would
become less and less distinguishable along this dimension from the
members of other groups. As a result, it would no longer be effi-
cient for firms to use membership in Group X as a proxy for
fighting.176
The writings of Thomas Sowell on the cultural inheritance of
ethnic groups are particularly pertinent here.7 Each group brings
with it habits of thought and behavior that served some purpose for
group members in the past, but that may be quite dysfunctional in
contemporary market societies."7 Groups may have formed their
values under conditions of rural isolation, Communist regimenta-
tion, slavery, feudal tenure arrangements, enforced paternalistic role
definitions (especially pertinent to women), welfare state
disincentives, itinerant wanderings, and so forth.
Speaking very broadly, these groups, when thrown together
into a market setting, will face pressures to assimilate and become
more like the generic market actor: cooperative and inoffensive,
self-regarding and self-reliant, willing to take initiative, cosmopoli-
tan, objective and noncredulous'7 Sowell's study of the radically
different cultures of the Irish, Italian, German, Jewish, and Polish
immigrants provides a striking case study in such assimilation,
since those groups in most discussions today are likely to be
175. See generally THOMAS SOWELL, ETHNIC AMERICA (1981) [hereinafter SOWELL,
ETHNIC AMERICA] (collecting the assimilation experiences of different ethnic groups in
America).
176. See Strauss, supra note 96, at 1640 (concluding that in the long run as the em-
ployer realizes that there are no productivity differences between the groups, it will no
longer be efficient to rely on the inaccurate generalization).
177. See generally SOWELL, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS, supra note 92; SOWELL, ETHNIC
AMERICA, supra note 175.
178. See SOWELL, ETHNIC AMERICA, supra note 175, at 284.
179. See id. at 294-96.
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grouped together as "whites," and many of the old differences are
long forgotten. 8°
The pressures of change will be greater on those groups
whose historical conditions were most different from the free mar-
ket regime into which they are entering.'' On the one hand,
those groups will receive more severe punishments from the system
for doing what comes naturally to them than will others.' On
the other hand, those groups have the most to gain in the long run
from readjusting their behavior, since the surpluses made possible
by market economies are great and behavioral change will enable
them for the first time to share in that surplus. The problem is that
the causal link between short-run discipline and long-run progress
is one that people are not predisposed to believe, and thus its
denial presents an opportunity for political demagogues.'83
To summarize, the free market imposes two changes on tastes
that are pertinent to race and gender relations. On the one hand,
the gratuitous biases of race and gender to which human beings are
probably predisposed are likely to be moderated by market pres-
sures. On the other hand, markets will ruthlessly recognize any real
correlates of race and gender, and these correlates will create pres-
sure on members of the excluded race or gender to begin changing
the tastes and behavior patterns that are implicated.
Free market institutions may never be given a full chance to
prove their tendencies. There is always the threat that they will be
interrupted either to reinstate, through collective action, our basic
prejudices or to interrupt market processes in hopes of a quicker,
Nirvana solution. If permitted, however, the long-run tendencies of
the markets are to undermine any rational basis for racial or gender
bias and to place increasing pressure on irrational biases. Both of
these tendencies should undermine whatever natural tendencies
people may have to treat others unequally because of race or gen-
der.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 286 ("It is the groups that lack such skills and entrepreneurship that are
dependent on others for employment and that have had to learn to speak their language
and know enough of their culture to make working together reasonably comfortable.").
182. See id.
183. Additionally, the short-run discipline may affect the current generation
disproportionately, while the long run benefits of assimilation may be realized primarily
by future generations.
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2. Markets, Race, and Gender: Empirical Correlations
Although the theoretical argument may seem plausible, it will,
of course, be argued that racial and gender prejudice empirically
persist, refuting the theoretical prediction that market pressures will
result in their progressive dilution. However, the purpose of this
discussion is not to argue that racism will disappear in a market
society; rather, the point is to show that the most fully assimilated
members of a market society will adopt values that run counter to
racism and sexism.
Many scholars have argued that racism and sexism are essen-
tially capitalistic phenomena.' If one is convinced that capital-
ism is a system whereby the propertied few hold down the em-
ployed many, there is a certain plausibility in tying this notion to
other forms of unfair treatment of persons, such as racial and gen-
der bias. However, the most casual empirical glance outside the
modem capitalist world shows the fundamental narrowness of vi-
sion implicit in the view that racism and sexism are essentially
capitalistic phenomena. 86
a. Gender
The dominance of women by men has been a ubiquitous, if
not universal, feature of human societies,'"7 and it is often shock-
ingly severe in those societies lacking developed market institu-
184. See Alan D. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLrICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 96, 114 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (discussing the im-
pact of capitalism on race relations); see generally MICHELE BARRETT, WOMEN'S OPPRES-
SION TODAY: THE MARXIST/FEMINIST ENCOUNTER (1988) (arguing that the oppression of
women is historically embedded in the social relations of capitalism).
185. See LEVIN, supra note 41, at 302-03:
Feminism gained influence in the general culture, in part, from its natural alli-
ance with the Left, broadly understood as that body of opinion which attributes
a great and hitherto unrecognized measure of human woe to the dominance of
the weak by the strong under "bourgeois liberty," woe preventable only by
state intervention.
186. See id. at 91 (noting the token character of female appointments to political posi-
tions in the former communist regimes).
187. See id. at 89 ("Every society that has ever existed has associated familial authority
with the male and conferred the overwhelming majority of positions of power on
males."); see generally STEVEN GOLDBERG, THE INEVITABILITY OF PATRIARCHY (1973)
(discussing the universality of patriarchy and its origins).
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tions.'88 Indeed, the very aspiration of equality between males and
females is often rejected in such societies. As D'Souza has written:
[M]any of these [non-Western] cultures have deeply in-
grained ideas of male superiority. The Koran stipulates that
'men have authority over women because Allah has made
the one superior to the other'. . . . In addition to non-
Western practices such as dowry, purdah, and wife-burning,
in countries such as Kenya, Somalia, Indonesia, and the
Sudan women are routinely circumcised in a manner which
deprives them of sexual pleasure for life .... Feminism is
simply not indigenous to non-Western cultures.'89
The relatively greater freedoms enjoyed by women in Western
societies may have their historical roots in the Roman Empire, with
its rather extensive market economy." The absolute level of per-
sonal freedom and independence accorded women during the Ro-
man Empire has been the subject of much debate, but there can be
little doubt that the inequality of status considerably diminished
over time. 9' In the early days of the Roman Republic the pater
familias, or male elder, held virtually complete power over the
family, including in many cases the powers of banishment, slavery,
sale, and death.'92 A young girl was instructed whom to marry,
and any property that she brought with her became property of the
husband.' 93
The power of the father steadily decreased during the Republic,
and conservative social critics persistently equated the growing
freedom of women with the decline of Roman morality."9 One
manifestation of the growing emancipation of women from the
control of their husbands was the increasing rate of divorce."
188. See generally ELISABETH BUMILLER, MAY You BE THE MOTHER OF A HUNDRED
SONS: A JOURNEY AMONG THE WOMEN OF INDIA (1990) (discussing the particularly poor
treatment of women in India).
189. D'SOUZA, supra note 40, at 79-80.
190. See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
192. See ELIZABETH MILLER WALSH, WOMEN IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION 64-65 (1981)
(discussing the complete power the eldest male held over the early Roman family).
193. See id. at 40 (discussing the role of guardian played by a woman's nearest male
relative).
194. See id. at 69-70 (describing Cato's fear that the repeal of a gender-based law
would speed the moral decline of the Republic).
195. See WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, HISTORY OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION: A HANDBOOK
152 (1986) ("Women became almost completely emancipated from the control of father
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Under the legislation of Augustus, mothers of three children were
granted the right to administer their property independently, and
adultery laws were passed to treat male and female adultery more
even-handedly. 96 During the reign of Marcus Aurelius, the law
provided that a woman's children, rather than her husband, could
inherit her property, with girls inheriting equally with boys.1 97
One influential account of world history has argued that, perhaps
under the sway of Stoic philosophy, "by the Severan period, mar-
ried women had attained an independence unparalleled in antiquity.
Henceforth the liberty and relatively extensive legal rights of wom-
en would be characteristic of the western world." 198
More recent experience with women and market institutions
also supports the idea that markets limit gender discrimination. 9
Notwithstanding a steady drumbeat of opposition from social crit-
ics, firms in the early industrial revolution made aggressive use of
female labor, finding themselves unable to pass up the potential for
lower wages or higher productivity on mere social prejudice
alone."s Women played a major role in the industrial revolution;
women, for example, were a very large percentage of the industrial
labor force in France, Zurich, and Prussia."0' Of course, gender
bias was undoubtedly more significant in more prestigious career
positions where technological barriers'02 kept the number of quali-
fied women down to a sufficiently low level that prejudice against
those who remained could be cheaply appeased.2 °3
and husband; divorce became easy and common [in the late Roman Republic].").
196. WALSH, supra note 192, at 71-72. Full equality on the law of adultery was not
attained until the reign of Emporer Constantine in 310 A.D. MARJORIE WALL BINGHAM
& SUSAN HILL GROSS, WOMEN IN ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 61 (1983).
197. See WALSH, supra note 197, at 72. On the other hand, this may have been de-
creed as much for the protection of the mother's father as for her, as the mother's father
would generally prefer that her property go to the grandchildren rather than the stepson.
Id.
198. THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD, supra note 144, at 215.
199. See infra notes 200-18 and accompanying text.
200. See HAMEROW, supra note 86, at 135 ("To many observers this composition of the
labor force in industry seemed a serious social evil. It made fathers dependent on the
earnings of those whom they should have been supporting. It took mothers away from
their duties of child rearing and housekeeping.").
201. Id. at 135 (56-70% in France, depending upon the department).
202. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
203. This analysis has been applied to the race context in SOWELL, MARKETS AND
MINORITIES, supra note 138, at 37:
The crucial element in destroying economic coalitions are the opportunities for
profit by individual members who violate the solidarity of the coalition. In
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While the number of women employed in industry declined
significantly in the later decades of the nineteenth century, employ-
ment was still substantial. On the eve of the First World War,
women constituted 22.6 percent of the labor force in Belgium, 33.1
percent in France, 23.0 percent in Great Britain, and 18.7 percent
in Germany.2" Despite these considerable numbers, an important
question remains as to whether the decline in female labor force
participation in the late nineteenth century, in addition to the well-
documented increase in segregation of women's employment in that
century, 5 constitutes evidence that market economies encouraged
sexist values.2"
Contemporary commentators are inclined to view a female taste
to avoid the labor force, or to stay away from employment in close
competition with men, as a kind of false consciousness, or a sub-
conscious attempt to reconcile oneself to the reality of discrimina-
tion. 7 It is particularly important not to project these sentiments
back into nineteenth century technological conditions where they
frequently did not apply-where the female taste to be able to stay
out of the workforce, supported by the labor of men, was not only
strong but often authentically grounded in fundamental realities of
the time.2"'
In particular, an analysis of nineteenth century trends must
consider some basic technological and demographic conditions
which had a disproprortionate impact upon the working lives of
women.2" Contraceptives and alternatives to breastfeeding were
either nonexistent or highly imperfect, and accordingly many wom-
situations where there are few opportunities for profit, the collusion may be
successful even when there are only minor sanctions available, perhaps no more
than social pressures. Exclusions against black violinists could be maintained
much more cheaply than discrimination against black sharecroppers in the past
or black basketball players today.
204. HAMEROW, supra note 86, at 144.
205. See Jane Humphries, ". . . The Most Free From Objection... ": The Sexual
Division of Labor and Women's Work in Nineteenth Century England, 47 J. ECON. HIST.
929, 932-35 (1987) (demonstrating and exploring this increase in gender segregation of the
workforce).
206. By "sexist" values here, I mean values that are hostile to the authentic, informed
aspirations of females in the society.
207. See, e.g., SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH 126-32 (describing how the movie industry
pressures women to stay home and out of the workforce).
208. See infra notes 209-17 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
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en spent the bulk of their working lives either pregnant or nurs-
ing.2t " At the same time, the rapidly growing population could no
longer be supported by traditional industries run directly out of or
close to the home."' Within the home, of course, modem labor-
saving devices such as refrigeration were primitive or absent."'
In such a world, the life of a working woman was exceptionally
difficult, and the decline in the labor force participation of wom-
en-occurring as it did against a backdrop of steadily improving
standards of living-cannot be assumed to have been in general
opposition to women's authentic preferences.
Jane Humphries has recently noted that the increasing segrega-
tion of the workforce by gender was also explainable by these
background conditions.214 Her empirical study shows that English
counties in which the sexes were highly integrated in the workforce
had high rates of illegitimate births, and that such children had
very little chance in life, partly because their mothers had no way
to feed them and earn a living at the same time3 As wages and
living standards rose throughout the century,"' women and girls
who could afford to stay out of the workplace increasingly did so,
while those who could not afford to do so gravitated toward segre-
gated workforces where the prospects for unwanted pregnancies
were smaller. 7
210. See Humphries, supra note 205, at 935 (stating that until relatively recently there
were few substitutes for breast milk).
211. See id. at 930.
212. See J.M. ROBERTS, THE PELICAN HISTORY OF THE WORLD 811 (rev. ed. 1984)
(discussing technology as a liberating force for women).
213. It might be argued that the overall societal structure was to blame for putting
women in this bind. Presumably one could have had governmental transfer payments for
child care that would have enabled women to work. Again, however, apart from the prob-
lem of feeding the child, the overall level of wealth must be considered. Per capita in-
come was far lower in the nineteenth century than it is today, so it is unclear where the
surplus could come from to cover these payments. See HAMEROW, supra note 86, at 136
(noting that the bulk of the population in Europe during the early stages of the industrial
revolution lived at a subsistence level).
214. See generally Humphries, supra note 205.
215. See id. at 942-46.
216. See.HAMEROW, supra note 86, at 141-47 (documenting this improvement in living
standards, which was astonishing by historical standards).
217. See Humphries. supra note 205, at 930 ("My hypothesis (hereafter called the so-
cial-control hypothesis) is that segregation in employment enabled almost all members of
working families to continue to work, as was essential for their survival, but in a frame-
work which discouraged heterosexual intimacy with its implicit threat to familial controls
over sexuality and mating.").
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In short, it may very well be true that the technological condi-
tions of the industrial revolution reinforced the value that women
should entertain different kinds of employment aspirations from
men. However, the idea that a market economy encouraged arbi-
trary discriminations between men and women does not follow;
employers were generally aggressive in hiring those women who
were willing within the severe constraints of available technology
to offer their labor. It is true that a certain distrust of the judgment
of young girls and women by their families is suggested by the
growing segregation of the workforce, and these assumptions and
sexual double standards might be regarded as sexist. On the other
hand, given the technological realities of the time, it is understand-
able how "Victorian" values could come to be at least as enthusi-
astically defended by women as by men."'
Other evidence simply will not support the idea that the nine-
teenth century market economy weakened the value of women's
equality." 9 The growth of basic educational opportunities for
women would belie that conclusion: it has been estimated that in
England the percentage of women unable to sign their name fell
from about 45 percent in 1850 to 1 percent in 1911 ." The femi-
nist movement itself primarily dates from this era, with Mary
Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Women"2' pub-
lished in 1792 and John Stuart Mill and Harriett Taylor's On the
Subjection of Women published in 1869.2 In Britain, the 1839
custody of infants act expanded the custodial rights of women over
their children, 3 and many historic female disempowerments were
reversed by the passage of the Married Women's Property Act in
1870.224 Political enfranchisement was slower in coming, but the
British women's suffrage movements from the nineteenth century
ultimately culminated in women receiving the right to run for
Parliament in 1919 and the right to vote in 1928. -z
218. See Irving Kristol, Men, Women, and Sex, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1992, at A24
(arguing that Victorian morality was a phenomenon of women's liberation).
219. See infra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
220. HAMEROW, supra note 86, at 168 (the comparable figures for men were 30 percent
in 1850 and 1 percent in 1911).
221. See Women's Liberation Movement, 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 733 (1987).
222. See WALSH, supra note 192, at 226-27 (discussing the essential co-authorship of
this book).
223. See id. at 212.
224. See Women's Liberation Movement, supra note 221, at 733.
225. See id. at 733. Admittedly, these political developments were the product of many
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Once again, the point is not that this progress in actual gender
relations was exceptionally fast, or that there was not a good deal
for feminists to be critical of in the condition of women throughout
the nineteenth century. However, there was a steady development
and internalization of the value of women's equality, a value that
could then generate discontent and calls for social change. As J.M.
Roberts has written:
[W]omen's rights to education, to employment, to control
of their own property, to moral independence, even to wear
more comfortable clothes, had increasingly been in debate
in the nineteenth century. Ibsen's play A Doll House was
interpreted as a trumpet-call for the liberation of women
instead of, as the author intended, a plea for the individual.
The bringing forward of such issues implied a real revolu-
tion. The claims of women in Europe and North America
threatened assumptions and attitudes which had n6t merely
centuries, but even millenia, of institutionalization behind
them.226
b. Race
The nineteenth century record regarding race relations also
should be considered. The most dramatic development was the
widespread attack on slavery. The slave trade was prohibited by
Denmark in 1792, England in 1807, Sweden in 1813, the Neth-
erlands in 1814, France in 1818, Spain in 1820, and Portugal in
1830.227 These prohibitions were aggressively enforced by the
British navy, which freed approximately 117,000 slaves intercepted
on the high seas.228
The target then became the existence of slavery itself. The
British colonies took emancipation measures in 1833, the French
colonies in 1848, the Portuguese colonies in 1858, India after
1858, the Dutch East Indies after 1859, the Spanish colonies in
1870, and, of course, the United States as a result of the Civil
factors apart from 19th century market dynamics, including especially the participation of
women in the First World War. However, many past wars had been fought without gener-
ating such social progress; the issue of female suffrage had to be on the political plate to
be influenced in this way.
226. ROBERTS, supra note 212, at 810.
227. HAMEROW, supra note 86, at 419.
228. Id. (noting that these enforcement figures covered the period 1815-1846).
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War.229 Looking backward, the progress seems inevitable, but
from the perspective of thousands of years of history in which
slavery or serfdom had been widely tolerated, the change must
have appeared revolutionary to the people whose new values made
them willing to bring it about.
Of course, racist sentiment was not eliminated with the aboli-
tion of slavery, but it had to have been somewhat softened for that
abolition even to have been considered. After the Reconstruction
period, much brutal repression against blacks in the Southern Unit-
ed States took place."3 On the other hand, competitive forces
continuously broke down attempts by white landowners to cartelize
the market for laborers or sharecroppers, with the result that the
wages and share percentages of black farmers continued to riseY
As for race relations, a general deterioration at the end of the
century in the South was juxtaposed against a widely perceived im-
provement in those relations in the North, where considerable inte-
gration took place.232 Thomas Sowell has written that this brief
and hopeful period in Northern race relations was upset when
Southern racism and Northern industrial jobs combined to produce
a mass exodus of relatively unassimilated, rural black migrants to
Northern cities, producing new demands for segregation on the part
of Northern whites.233
It is true that racism was a major force in nineteenth century
market societies and remains a major force in the market societies
of the twentieth century. The idea that markets will wholly stamp
out racism cannot be substantiated by the historical record.2" On
the other hand, it should be noted that the human report card on
race relations generally is one of repeated and massive failure, not
excluding genocide, enslavement, and war. Despite the predictions
229. Id. ("The abolition of slavery thus came at about the same time as the abolition of
serfdom, for essentially the same reasons.").
230. See Benno C. Schmidt Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race
in the Progressive Era. Par 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 646, 650 (1982)
(discussing the system of peonage, which was one of the worst manifestations of discrimi-
nation).
231. See SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES, supra note 138, at 36-37 (citing compari-
sons between the standard of living of sharecroppers who were illiterate and those who
could read).
232. See id. at 70-71 (identifying temporary but growing acceptance of blacks in North-
ern states).
233. See id. at 71-73.
234. See PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, THE ETHNIC PHENOMENON at xi (1981) (noting
the disappointment of liberal expectations that racism could be eradicated over time).
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of academics, socialist societies have been notably hostile to their
ethnic minorities." Moreover, many non-Western cultures have
no appreciable tradition of racial equality, not only violating it in
practice, but regarding the principle with suspicion.23 The prog-
ress of race relations during the period of laissez faire looks much
better against the backdrop of the broader view of interethnic rela-
tions around the world and over time."
Finally, even if the empirical experience of modem mixed
economies does not show that such societies mitigate racism and
sexism as values, it does not mean that the theory is incorrect.
When an economic theory appears to be sound in its own right but
incompatible with experience, the problem is often not that the
predicted tendency is refuted but that it is being camouflaged by
empirical considerations outside the scope of the theory." An
economy such as ours with more than a trillion dollar federal bud-
get is influenced by many factors other than marketplace dynamics.
Collective racism is quite likely, since collective actors lack the
personal incentive to see through their own racial and gender
myths. 9 Blacks are handicapped by innumerable actions of the
government, including inadequate public schooling, occupational
licensing restrictions, minimum wage laws, exclusionary zoning,
and the perverse incentive structures of the welfare system and the
drug laws.' 4 As a result, the tendencies of the market to reduce
235. See id.:
[I]n the socialist tradition, these phenomena [racism and ethnocentrism] are seen
as the product of the capitalist mode of production and as misguided forms of
"false consciousness" destined to wither away after the advent of socialism.
Both ideological traditions [liberalism and socialism] have been equally at a
loss to explain the persistence, indeed the resurgence, of ethnic and racial senti-
ments in both the advanced capitalist and socialist societies. These sentiments
will not obligingly go away, as both ideologies predict.
236. See D'SouzA, supra note 40, at 79.
237. And, of course, the nineteenth century looks far more progressive in these regards
against the backdrop of subsequent developments in racial hostility, from the Nazi holo-
caust to persecution of Chinese "boat people" in Southeast Asia to ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia.
238. See LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION 38-44 (2d ed. 1963); see also MURRAY
N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE 9 (1962).
239. See Christopher T. Wonnell, Was the Corruption of Civil Rights Law Inevitable?,
31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269, 272-75 (1994) (reviewing RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS (1992)).
240. See WILLIAMs, supra note 156, at 87.
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racism and sexism may merely be camouflaged by these larger
trends.
III. MARKET-GENERATED VALUES TURNED AGAINST MARKETS
A. The Phenomenon Described
One of the most interesting and paradoxical aspects of the
question of market-generated values is the use of those values as
justifications for superseding the market. As noted earlier, when
markets generate values, they are also likely to generate forms of
discontent and calls for reform that are motivated by those val-
ues. 241 However, there is no assurance that the institutions which
nurtured those values will be treated with respect by the persons
who have acquired the values.242
For example, consider the value of equal treatment, and its
accompanying hostility to race and gender discrimination. As noted,
there are reasons to believe that the market system is a powerful
force both for overcoming irrational prejudices and for assimilating
people to overcome rational differences between groups. 43 How-
ever, racial and gender bias still make numerous appearances in the
decisions of market actors. Accordingly, Congress decided that the
market needed to be superseded with civil rights legislation de-
signed to outlaw these actions.2
As Richard Epstein has noted, the original civil rights laws
could be defended as market-friendly statutes. 45 Individual firms
in the deep South may very well have wanted to end their own
discrimination (a plausible assumption, given the costs of overlook-
ing talent) but feared selective retribution from private or union
violence, or state discrimination from the racist Southern govern-
ments.2' The laws were simply applying force to break the log-
241. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Internal Criticism
Problem).
242. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942) (sug-
gesting that the market economy might generate the causes of its own destruction).
243. See supra notes 114-83 and accompanying text.
244. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393-94 (discussing the need for federal civil rights legislation).
245. EPSTEIN, supra note 158, at 126-29 (arguing that the original civil rights laws
provided the necessary protection to hotels and restaurants that wanted to serve both
blacks and whites, but feared retribution).
246. Id. at 93-94. Although Epstein does not point this out, the discrimination also may
have been the product of private social pressure, especially in fields where the number of
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jam, so that market institutions could evolve in the South in the
way they had evolved more naturally in areas where entitlements
were more secure.
247
Whatever the original intention, however, it is now widely
agreed that the civil rights laws have deviated considerably from
this market-supportive function.248 Efficiency rationales are now
considered inadequate to justify practices with disparate impact. 9
Individuals and occupations are sometimes mismatched to satisfy
administrative number counts, generating both physical and psycho-
logical costs.aso
Predictably, as the law has moved further away from the mar-
ket setting, there has been a change in values associated with race
and gender. Through an agonizing process, the values of equal
treatment and assimilation have gradually given way to the values
of proportionality and diversity." Race consciousness changed
from a dangerous anachronism to a short-term necessary evil to a
permanently desirable part of group self-definition in a remarkably
short period of time."s Something similar has happened in femi-
blacks with the requisite training was sufficiently small that prejudice could be maintained
relatively cheaply.
247. See id. at 127 ("Title VII . . . provided powerful protection to the mass of private
firms that wanted to escape the clutches of local restrictions and local prejudices but
could not.").
248. See id. at 182-201 (arguing that poor statutory construction contravened the intent
of the civil rights laws by extending their protection from victims of disparate treatment
to the much broader class of persons suffering from the disparate impact of legitimate
employment practices).
249. See id. at 300-09 (describing how Pan American World Airways could not justify
hiring only female flight attendants, despite offering proof that customers preferred female
flight attendants and that female flight attendants were better able to meet passengers'
emotional needs).
250. CLINT BOLICK, UNFINISHED BusiNEss 31-40 (1990) (detailing the theoretical flaws,
practical failures, and social and economic costs of this new civil rights agenda).
251. See NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION 37-76 (1975) (criticizing the
major legislative and judicial landmarks that have focused on statistics rather than individ-
ual cases).
252. Compare The Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20) (1988):
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committeee
subject to this title to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any
group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such indi-
vidual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin employed ..
with Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that
preferential admissions for minorities does not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
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nist literature, where the original calls for inclusion and for mini-
mizing irrational gender stereotyping have evolved into doctrines of
inherent differences between the fundamental value structures and
thought processes of men and women. 3
The decision to supersede the market in the area of race and
gender has also led, somewhat predictably, to a decline in the other
values that market institutions tend to generate. Consider, for exam-
ple, the value of tolerance and the marketplace of ideas. It was
argued earlier that a market society, although it placed a great
emphasis on truth, would also tend to generate a tolerance of falsi-
ty, since with few collective decisions there was less to fear from
the development of various seductive but false myths.' The civil
rights approach, however, is determined to identify collectively
what the productivity of the two genders and various races is, what
types of job tests are proper measures of that productivity, and
what distribution of employment would be indicative of discrimi-
nation. 5 With so much riding on those collective determinations,
it no longer seems safe to allow certain ideas about race, gender,
and productivity to circulate freely in the marketplace of ideas.
I believe that this is the root cause of the familiar trend toward
insistence on a strict orthodoxy of political correctness, with broad
prohibitions on hate speech and the like. In legal academia, the law
reviews are increasingly filled with analyses of why various types
of speech should no longer be protected by the First
Amendment.256 There is a widespread fear, justified or not, that
1964).
253. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 6-23 (1982) (correlating differences in the comparison of male
and female behavior against historical standards with the male dominance found in the
development of the standards).
254. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
255. See generally Epstein, supra note 158, at 205-41, 290-91 (rejecting the costs im-
posed by non-market job tests, and criticizing the disparate impact basis for finding dis-
crimination).
256. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 177-97 (1987) (criti-
cizing First Amendment protection of pornography); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2356-61 (1989)
(arguing for less First Amendment protection of racist speech); Cass R. Sunstein, Adminis-
trative Substance, 411 DuKE LJ. 607, 641-42 (1991) (advocating a fairness obligation in
broadcasting of public issues and/or a subsidy system); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography
and the First Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 602-17 (1986) (redefining the standards
for analyzing the First Amendment protection of pornography); Robert L. West, Constitu-
tional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. REv. 765, 767-68 (1992) (criticizing First Amendment pro-
tection of hate speech).
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people will arrive at certain "incorrect" viewpoints when making
all-important collective decisions pertaining to race and gender.
And there is, quite rightly, no confidence that people will be able
to see through the flaws in false depictions of women and minori-
ties, given the weak incentives that all people have to see through
their own comfortable myths in any collective activity.
In short, the civil rights laws are a classic example of a pre-
dictable sequence of events: market institutions generate particular
values, which (especially in keeping with the impatience produced
by the Internal Criticism Problem) lead to rejection of market
institutions as inadequate to advance those values with sufficient
speed and certainty. In turn, the replacement of markets not only
fails to vindicate the hoped-for values (equal treatment and assimi-
lation), but eventually leads to an abandonment of those values
even as ideals. The replacement of markets also leads to the steady
erosion of other market-generated values such as the tolerance for
error embodied in the marketplace of ideas theory of the First
Amendment.
The civil rights laws are not the only example of this self-
defeating cycle. The market-generated taste for nonhegemonic hu-
man relations has also been employed aggressively to undermine
market institutions. Radical change in this century has often been
justified on the theory that it would protect the working class from
the oppression of capitalist superiors." More moderate changes,
such as the doctrine of unconscionability in contract law, or such
creations of the administrative state as the National Labor Relations
Act, have been offered with similar justifications."5 Iistitutions of
indentured labor such as apprenticeship have rapidly declined, and
are of doubtful constitutionality under contemporary interpretations
of the Thirteenth Amendment." Unconscionability regulation has
particularly targeted contracts that provide one party with the dis-
cretion to take some action which would severely harm the other
party, such as the right of a franchisor to discontinue a relationship
into which the franchisee has made a significant investment."e
257. See Wonnell, The Influential Myth, supra note 113, at 39 (discussing and
criticizing this philosophy).
258. See id. at 39-48 (identifying the unequal bargaining power between employer and
employee as the conventional justification for legislative and judicial enforcement of labor
standards).
259. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 437, 458 n.99 (1989).
260. See Leibel v. Raynor Mfg. Co. 571 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (impos-
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In some instances, these regulations will succeed at their objec-
tive of reducing hegemonic human relations. As noted earlier,
market institutions have no incentive to minimize hierarchy, since
hierarchical relations may generate a surplus that works to the
benefit of both contracting parties. However, this success necessari-
ly comes at the cost of sacrificing the very surplus which motivat-
ed the parties to agree to the relation in the first instance. Without
the right to enforce apprenticeship contracts, for example, employ-
ers have far less incentive to finance the training of new employ-
ees.26' And without a clear right to terminate franchises (con-
strained more by the franchisor's reputation than by law), franchi-
sees have an incentive to chisel on their own investments in quali-
ty, free riding on the expected investments of others.262
On the other hand, not all regulations of this type serve to
decrease hegemonic human relations. To say the least, the radical
anti-market regimes such as the old Soviet Union, Maoist China, or
Cambodia, became brutally hierarchical and cruel. On a smaller
scale, the regulatory state has generated new hierarchies between
the regulators and the regulated. Implied contract terms such as the
duty of "good faith and fair dealing" are notoriously vague, and as
a practical manner will mean whatever a particular judge, jury or
administrative agency say they do. The sometimes arrogant or
arbitrary behavior of judges and regulators, facing few of the tight
competitive constraints of market actors, and the supplication of the
regulated, are a far cry from the type of human relations tradition-
ally prized by market actors.
Nor is the corruption of human relations mitigated by the ten-
dency of the regulated to invest so heavily in courting the regu-
lators that they sometimes seem to have coopted the regulators into
their own service. 3 Such private aggressiveness does make the
ing duty to give extended notice before terminating a distributor).
261. See Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees, 46
STAN. L. REV. 87, 105-09, 116-20 (1993) [hereinafter Wonnell, Contractual
Disempowerment] (noting the economic pressures that eroded a mutually beneficial rela-
tionship between employer and apprentice).
262. See Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of 'Unfair' Contractual Ar-
rangements, in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 139, 142-44 (Victor
Goldberg ed. 1989) (explaining that short-term profits are available to franchisees who
reduce quality below the franchisor's standards).
263. See generally THE MONOPOLY MAKERS 12-31 (Mark J. Green ed. 1973) (arguing
that regulated industries court their regulators which, in turn, causes waste, hinders eco-
nomic growth, and reduces the likelihood of public debate).
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regulated firm a less sympathetic figure, but the problems of de-
pendence are fundamentally public rather than private. A particular
problem is that any sensible regulated individual or firm will re-
frain from exercising a theoretical right to speak out about the
behavior of the regulators, however vital such information from
those intimately involved in the daily battles would be to the pub-
lic dialogue."
Despite these evils of unfettered discretion, the taste for clear
rules that might confine bureaucratic caprice has been in decline as
the regulatory state has progressively superseded market
ordering."r  As institutions regulating private behavior have
evolved, the trend has been to see wisdom in legal "flexibility"
and discretion, opposing arbitrary and "rigid" rules that would
preclude adaptation to circumstances.' Once again, the dynamic
has been to use market values to undermine market institutions,
and then to see the resulting institutions erode not only the practice
of the market value in question but also the taste for that value.
B. The Phenomenon Evaluated
This Article has argued that four constitutional values-free
expression, the sanctity of private conscience, nonhegemonic human
relations, and equal treatment-are values that are the natural ten-
dencies of market institutions.267 Markets may not create these
tastes, but they surely strengthen people's beliefs in the importance
of those tastes, and thus make them logical candidates for the
fundamental constitutional values of the polity. Markets also oper-
ate so as to better satisfy the values, but they rarely are capable of
satisfying the tastes they create so completely as to remove the
incentive to try to do better by superseding markets.
When the markets are set aside in an attempt to more rapidly
effectuate market values, two things usually happen. The first is
that the reform fails to bring about the intended value, and the
second is that people begin to lose the taste for the value itself. An
important question is whether this latter phenomenon, and the
former given that the latter has occurred, are changes to be regret-
264. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 16-21 (noting the difficulties in establishing insti-
tutions that will effectively preserve the possibility of dissent).
265. See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
266. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1685, 1687-713, 1740-51 (1987) (discussing the relation between the
rules/standards debate and the debate over the justice of a market economy).
267. See supra notes 45-240 and accompanying text.
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ted. From the perspective of our cultural ancestors and to a large
extent from our own perspective, it would be a tragedy for a soci-
ety to give up on the attempts to secure equal treatment or reli-
gious tolerance. If our cultural descendants have abandoned these
values, however, and therefore do not count the change as regres-
sion, how can one say that anything has been lost by turning
against the markets?
Some relief from such extreme relativism seems possible. Many
human tastes and needs surely come relatively hard-wired into hu-
man beings, especially their basic biological needs for a minimum
level of material well being and for a certain social respect."
Even if not strictly determined biologically, these values are likely
to outlast the more intellectualized virtues identified here. This fact
raises the possibility that the more abstract virtues may be desirable
not only as ends in themselves but as means of promoting these
more durable ends. 69
Most of the constitutional values serve pragmatic purposes of
avoiding conflict, strife and rent seeking that will dig deeply into
the social surplus from which people fulfill their basic needs. If we
lose our taste for the abstract constitutional values as ends in them-
selves, we may find ourselves unable to satisfy even the tastes that
remain. This surely has been the case with societies that have
thoroughly undermined the market.' The proclivity of people to
leave nonmarket societies in droves is some indication that the
constitutional values of market societies, even where no longer
cherished as abstract ideals, have desirable properties as proxies for
more enduring values.
In any event, there is no apparent reason why contemporary
trends or proposals should be judged only by the values which
would endure after the markets had been superceded. Those trends
are being initiated by people whose values have been generated by
market institutions, and who would, from their own perspective,
regard it as a loss if those values were not embraced by succeed-
ing generations. Marx apparently hoped that people would turn
268. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN at
xii-xiii (1992) (concluding that the ability of a society that combines a market economy
and a democratic polity to satisfy the two basic human needs of materiality and social
respect has resulted in the "end of history" in a Hegelian sense).
269. See Wonnell, Contractural Disempowerment, supra note 261, at 123-30 (arguing
that an "applied political philosophy" of liberal political values may indirectly promote a
"pure normative philosophy" of more utilitarian norms).
270. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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against accepted values if they realized that they were merely a
superstructure for a capitalist base.27' To the contrary, internal
critics of the capitalist system have almost always believed that
their anti-market reforms would advance these constitutional values
rather than retard them or subject them to public ridicule. If the
world of values is seriously relativistic, the objective of this Article
becomes primarily an ad hominem one, of urging market critics to
ask themselves whether they are indeed taking us where they want
to go.
271. See KARL MARX, CAPITAL 238 (C. Kerr trans., 1919) (arguing that cultural phe-
nomena are primarily superstructure for the economic base).
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